The Bush Republican Record of Getting it Wrong in Iraq: It's Time for a New Direction

From the use of intelligence in the lead up to the war, to pre-war planning and post-war strategy and implementation, the Bush Administration’s key policies for securing and rebuilding Iraq have proven short-sighted and misguided.  Flawed policies on troop levels, detainee treatment, countering terrorist and insurgent forces, and restoring basic services have frustrated U.S. efforts to stabilize the country while also undermining Iraqi efforts to build a legitimate, viable government.  Despite the costs that its mistakes have imposed on U.S. taxpayers, America’s security and the larger struggle in the war on terrorism, the Bush Administration has been unwilling to recognize its missteps or level with the American people about the situation in Iraq.  Instead, for more than three and a half years, the Administration has called on Americans to support its “stay the course” strategy while failing to provide an effective plan for achieving victory – or even moving forward – in Iraq.  With public support for the Iraq war waning, the President now says that his plan is flexible and has always allowed for changes in strategy to complete the mission in Iraq.  Considering its record of failed policies, poor judgment, and weak accountability, why should the American people trust the Bush Administration to chart the right course in Iraq?

 

 

PRE-WAR ASSESSMENTS

 

• WRONG ON IRAQ-AL QAEDA LINK.  There were no operational links between Saddam and al Qaeda.  The Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Phase II report found that pre-war intelligence did not present compelling evidence of cooperation between Iraq and al Qaeda.  The CIA noted that their “assessment of al-Qa’ida’s ties to Iraq rests on a body of fragmented, conflicting reporting from sources of varying reliability” and also reported that “any such ties would be rooted in deep suspicion.”  Similarly, the pre-war assessment by the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) stated that “compelling evidence demonstrating direct cooperation between the government of Iraq and al-Qa’ida has not been established.”  The Senate Intelligence Committee investigation concluded that, “Postwar findings indicate that Saddam Hussein was distrustful of al-Qa’ida and viewed Islamic extremists as a threat to his regime, refusing all requests from al-Qa’ida to provide material or operational support.” (Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Phase II Report, 9/8/06)

• WRONG ON IRAQ’S NUCLEAR CAPACITY.  Iraq was not reconstituting its nuclear program; Saddam had terminated the program more than a decade before the U.S.-led invasion.  According to the Iraq Survey Group (ISG), “Saddam Hussein ended the nuclear program in 1991 following the Gulf War.  ISG found no evidence to suggest concerted efforts to restart the program.” (Iraq Survey Group final report, key findings, 10/6/04)

• WRONG ON WMD.  Iraq did not possess chemical or biological weapons.  In addition to its conclusions about Iraq’s nuclear program, the Iraq Survey Group reported that “Iraq abandoned its ambition to obtain advanced BW [biological weapons]” after 1996.”  Similarly, the Group reported that “While a small number of old, abandoned chemical munitions have been discovered, ISG judges that Iraq unilaterally destroyed its undeclared chemical weapons stockpile in 1991.” (Iraq Survey Group final report, key findings, 10/6/04)

• WRONG ON BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS LABS.  Iraq did not have mobile biological weapons labs.   The Iraq Survey Group report states that: “In spite of exhaustive investigation, ISG found no evidence that Iraq possessed, or was developing BW [biological weapon] agent production systems.”  Although the White House and senior Administration officials announced in May of 2003 that Coalition forces had located mobile biological weapons labs, their assertions were false: the claims of a mobile weapons lab discovery already had been debunked by the DIA.  According to press reports, in a report that remains classified, the DIA team dispatched by the Pentagon concluded that the trailers were not intended for the production of weapons of mass destruction.  According to one team member, “within four hours it was clear to everyone that these were not biological labs.” (Washington Post, 4/12/06; Washington Post, 4/14/06)

• WRONG ON UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLES (UAV).  Saddam did not pose a biological or chemical threat to his neighbors or to the United States; Iraq’s experimental UAV program had been terminated in 2001 and was judged unlikely to involve WMD weapons delivery.  The final report of the Iraq Survey Group states that: “ISG has uncovered only limited information indicating an overall program intent for unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) to deliver chemical or biological warfare agents.”  In addition, the report notes that the “evidence available to ISG concerning the UAV programs active at the onset of OIF [Operation Iraqi Freedom] indicates these systems were intended for reconnaissance and electronic warfare.”  These conclusions reflect dissenting assessments made by the U.S. Air Force’s National Air and Space Intelligence Center in the October 2002 NIE, in which the Air Force stated that it “does not agree that Iraq is developing UAVs primarily intended to be delivery platforms for chemical and biological (CBW) agents,” and that, “The small size of Iraq’s new UAV strongly suggests a primary role of reconnaissance.” (Iraq Survey Group, final report, Volume II, 10/6/04; National Intelligence Council, Iraq’s Continuing Program for Weapons of Mass Destruction, Key Judgments from the October 2002 NIE)

• WRONG ON IRAQ’S CONVENTIONAL THREAT.  Saddam was effectively contained: his army did not pose a conventional military threat to the region.  In its Phase I investigation into Iraq pre-war intelligence, the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence review of pre-war intelligence analyzed over 400 documents written by the intelligence agencies from 1991 to 2003.  Its report concluded that, “the body of assessments showed that Iraqi military capabilities had steadily degraded following defeat in the Persian Gulf War in 1991.  Analysts also believed those capabilities would continue to erode as long as economic sanctions remained in place.” (Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, 7/9/04)

 

 

POST-WAR PLANNING

 

• WRONG ON WAR PLAN.  Dismissing advice from top military officials, the Bush Administration re-wrote the war plan for Iraq.   Describing an interview with Secretary Rumsfeld and General Peter Pace, the New York Times reported in the fall of 2002 that: “Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld said today that he had ordered the military’s regional commanders to rewrite all of their war plans to capitalize on precision weapons, better intelligence and speedier deployment.  That way, he said, the military could begin combat operations on less notice and with far fewer troops than thought possible – or even wise – before the Sept. 11 attacks.”  Rumsfeld told reporters that, “Looking at what was overwhelming force a decade or two decades ago, today you can have overwhelming force, conceivably, with lesser numbers because the lethality is equal to or greater than before.”  Senior military officers, including Army Chief General Shinseki, however, say that the Administration “micromanaged” the deployment plan and placed too few troops on the ground in Iraq, imposing unnecessary risks to U.S. forces and the mission in Iraq.  Military leaders rightly argued that a larger ground force would be vital for contingency planning, should Baghdad not have fallen as quickly and for ensuring order and security in the days following the fighting. (New York Times,10/13/02; Washington Post, 10/30/02; James Fallows, “Blind into Baghdad,” The Atlantic Monthly, 1/1/04)

• WRONG ON TROOP LEVELS.  The Bush Administration failed to commit enough troops to secure the peace in Iraq.  In the words of retired Major General John Batiste: “Our great military lost a critical window of opportunity to secure Iraq because of inadequate troop levels and capability required to impose security, crush a budding insurgency, and set the conditions for the rule of law in Iraq.  We were undermanned from the beginning, lost an early opportunity to secure the country, and have yet to regain the initiative.” (Testimony before the Democratic Policy Committee, 9/25/06)

• WRONG ON THE STRATEGY FOR SECURING THE PEACE.  The Bush Administration failed to develop a comprehensive set of policies for victory in Iraq.  Citing interviews from top administration advisors, including the head of the National Security Council’s Iraq office, Bob Woodward’s State of Denial, reports that, as late as the fall of 2004, the Administration had no real strategy for achieving U.S. goals in Iraq.  According to some media reports, Secretary Rumsfeld even opposed efforts led by military strategists to develop a plan for post-war Iraq. (Bob Woodward, State of Denial, p. 265; McClatchy-Tribune Newspapers, 9/9/06)

• WRONG ON SUPPORTING THE TROOPS.  The Bush Administration sent U.S. troops into Iraq with insufficient body armor and up-armored vehicles.  It was not until January of 2004 – ten months after the start of military operations in Iraq – that all U.S. troops received body armor.  Similarly, poor management and insufficient funding has led to delays and shortages of up-armored vehicles for forces in Iraq, leaving our troops with inadequate protection years into combat operations.  In recent testimony before the Senate Democratic Policy Committee, Colonel Thomas Hammes (USMC, Ret.) spoke of the Administration’s shortcomings on equipment procurement and troop support: “The administration has refused to dedicate the resources necessary” to provide vital equipment to our troops.  He said that these shortcomings are “symptoms of a much greater problem – the Pentagon’s refusal to act as if we are at war.  Since World War II, America has prided itself on providing whatever its servicemen and women needed to get the job done.  In this war, we have not.  Our procurement has not only been slow, we have failed to buy the best available.  Further, the Administration has categorically failed to maintain or replace the equipment necessary for units in the U.S. to be ready for other potential operations.”  Colonel Hammes said that this “failure to provide our best equipment is a serious moral failure on the part of our leadership.” (New York Times, 3/7/05; New York Times, 6/25/05; Testimony before the Democratic Policy Committee, 9/25/06)

• WRONG ON THREAT OF INSURGENCY.  In spite of warnings from the intelligence community, the Bush Administration failed to take action to prevent the emergence of an Iraqi insurgency.  Relying on their assertions that the U.S.-led Coalition would be greeted as liberators in Iraq, the President and senior Administration officials largely dismissed repeated warnings made by the CIA and the National Intelligence Council in early 2003 about the threat of an Iraqi insurgency developing in response to the U.S.-led invasion.  As a result, the Administration failed to take the steps necessary to prevent the emergence and, later on, the growth of a powerful Iraqi insurgency which, more than three and a half years later, continues to undermine security and stability in Iraq and poses a real threat to its newly formed government. (USA Today, 10/24/04; Thomas Ricks, Fiasco, 2006)

• WRONG ON COST OF WAR.  The Bush Administration grossly underestimated the costs of the war in Iraq.  To date, the U.S. has allocated $379 billion for efforts to bring security and stability to Iraq – more than seven times what Administration officials were estimating in the lead-up to war and nearly double the estimate made by the President’s then-economic advisor, Lawrence Lindsey (which was criticized by other Administration officials at the time as being excessive).  And the costs are expected to grow significantly in the coming years: the Congressional Budget Office recently estimated that the final cost of the war would run between $493 and $697 billion, while some outside estimates have suggested that costs could reach upwards of $2 trillion.  The war in Iraq has not only imposed an enormous burden on U.S. taxpayers, but, as the Comptroller General recently testified, the cost of operations in Iraq have contributed to unsustainable fiscal practices that threaten our economic and national security. (Congressional Research Service RL 33110, 9/26/06; Linda Bilmes and Joseph Stiglitz, “The Economic Cost of War in Iraq,” 2/06; David Walker Testimony before the Senate Budget Committee, 2/15/06)

• WRONG ON COST OF RECONSTRUCTION.  In contrast to Bush Administration claims that Iraq would not require sustained aid and that the country would be able to finance the majority of its reconstruction through oil revenues, rebuilding Iraq has proven a costly and sustained commitment.  So far, the United States has spent $20.9 billion on reconstruction efforts, more than twelve times the $1.7 billion then USAID Administrator Andrew Natsios estimated in early 2003.  And as the Comptroller General told the House Government Reform Committee, Iraq will need an estimated $50 billion in additional funds to finance remaining reconstruction needs and to restore, sustain and protect basic services. (CRS RL 33110, 9/22/06) 

• WRONG ON STAFFING POLICIES.  The Bush Administration favored party loyalty and political allegiances over merit in hiring for key positions in the Iraq occupation and reconstruction effort.  As detailed by various news media reports and Rajiv Chandrasekaran’s Imperial Life in the Emerald City, in many instances, this cronyism led the Administration to overlook experienced and qualified individuals and, in effect, has compromised the more important rebuilding effort.  According to Frederick Smith, the deputy director of the Coalitional Provisional Authority’s Washington office, “We didn’t tap – and it should have started from the White House on down – just didn’t tap the right people to do this job.” (Rajiv Chandrasekaran, Imperial Life in the Emerald City, 2006)

POST-WAR POLICIES

 

• WRONG ON STRATEGY.  The Bush Administration’s failure to adopt an effective counterterrorism and counterinsurgency strategy has frustrated initiatives to stabilize and secure Iraq.  It has become clear that the central tenet guiding the Bush strategy in Iraq – the notion that U.S. forces will stand down as Iraqi forces stand up – has proven deficient for achieving U.S. goals in Iraq.  In fact, as more Iraqi troops have been trained and stood up, the security situation in Iraq has continued to deteriorate.  Realities on the ground have prompted widespread calls for rethinking the current strategy among military and policy experts as well as political officials from both sides of the aisle.  According to the nonpartisan Government Accountability Office (GAO), the Bush Administration’s current Iraq strategy is “inadequate;” its plan lacks “all the key characteristics of an effective national strategy.” (GAO-06-788, 7/06)

• WRONG ON POLICY TO DISBAND IRAQI ARMY.  Against the expressed advice of military experts, the Bush Administration demobilized the entire Iraqi army in May of 2003.  According to a number of top Iraqi leaders and U.S. officials and experts, that decision was one of the gravest mistakes made in Iraq reconstruction; it not only undermined efforts to establish order and secure Iraq’s borders, it also effectively alienated hundreds of thousands of former Iraqi soldiers from the U.S.-led reconstruction effort.  In the resulting security vacuum, insurgents were able to regroup and sectarian militias were able to form, while decommissioned soldiers became easy fodder for anti-government forces. (Washington Post, 11/20/03; Thomas Ricks, Fiasco, 2006)

• WRONG ON DE-BAATHIFICATION.  The Bush Administration’s de-Baathification policies severely complicated post-conflict governance in Iraq and provided fuel to the insurgency.  On May 16, 2003, Ambassador Bremer ordered a ban of the Baath Party, effectively barring all senior party members as well as many lower-level members – tens of thousands of Iraqis – from public service.  According to an American special-forces officer stationed in Baghdad at the time, “The problem with the blanket ban is that you get rid of the infrastructure; I mean, after all, these guys ran the country, and you polarize them.  So did these decisions contribute to the insurgency?   Unequivocally, yes.  And we have to ask ourselves: How well did we really know how to run Iraq?  Zero.”  And as one high-ranking former official of Saddam’s Foreign Ministry told the New Yorker, “The Americans made a big mistake by initiating the de-Baathification process; it was antidemocratic and inhumane, and it did not take into account who the Baathists are.  After thirty-five years, the Baath Party had become part of the fabric of Iraqi society, a complex, interrelated pyramid of economic, political, religious, and tribal links, with the President, yes, at the top.  …But to dismantle the Party, the Army, and other structures of the state was only to replace them with chaos.” (The New Yorker, 11/15/04)

• WRONG ON RECONSTRUCTION CONTRACTING POLICIES.  The Bush Administration’s reconstruction program in Iraq has been marred by waste, fraud, abuse, and corruption.  According to government auditors, weak oversight, unfair contracting policies, and failure to sufficiently employ Iraqi firms in the reconstruction effort, has led to unprecedented waste of U.S. taxpayer money and produced disappointing results in Iraq’s reconstruction program.  In one of its most recent reports, the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR) estimates that as much as 55 percent of reconstruction project funds were lost to contractor overhead costs. (New York Times, 10/25/06)

• WRONG ON REGIONAL IMPACT OF WAR.  U.S. policies in Iraq are promoting regional insecurity.  Contrary to Administration claims that a new regime in Iraq would inspire reformers and encourage the spread of democracy throughout the Middle East, experts say that the war and the Administration’s failure to quell the violence and stabilize the country has effectively empowered hardliners across the Middle East and could potentially destabilize the region.  According to James Dobbins, the former Bush White House envoy and current director of international security at RAND, “if anything, it’s become a counter-model” for democracy. (Christian Science Monitor, 7/26/06)

• WRONG ON WAR’S IMPACT ON THE GLOBAL WAR ON TERRORISM.  The Bush Administration’s Iraq policies are undermining efforts against global terrorism.  According to the April 2006 National Intelligence Estimate (NIE), the war in Iraq has created more terrorists worldwide and has served to elevate extremist ideologies.  The estimate states that, “The Iraq conflict has become the ‘cause celebre’ for jihadists, breeding a deep resentment of US involvement in the Muslim world and cultivating supporters for the global jihadist movement.” (National Intelligence Estimate, 4/2006)

• WRONG ON SUPPORT TO U.S. MILITARY.  Mismanagement and misguided Bush policies have placed considerable stress on our Armed Forces, led to recruiting and retention challenges, and resulted in vital equipment shortages.  A report prepared for the Pentagon earlier this year concluded that the Army cannot maintain its current level of operations without risking permanent damage to the quality of its force.  In testimony before Congress in July, Army Chief of Staff General Schoomaker reported funding shortfalls and voiced significant concerns about the Army’s readiness levels.  He told lawmakers that the Army will need $17 billion in 2007 and as much as $13 billion annually until two years after the end of the Iraq war to reset equipment and ensure readiness.  Despite these dire warnings, the Bush Administration’s recently-issued Fiscal Year 2008 budget planning guidance falls nearly $18 billion short of what the Army says it needs, raising fears that the current strain will only grow worse in years to come. (Andrew Krepenevich, Thin Green Line, 1/06; USA Today, 7/27/06)

• WRONG ON DETAINEE POLICIES.  Bush Republican policies on treatment of suspected terrorists fail to ensure Geneva Convention guarantees and, in turn, have proven counterproductive to winning the war on terror; these policies also are eroding U.S. moral leadership and providing fuel for extremist ideologies.  The Bush Administration’s failure to articulate a comprehensive and legally solid set of policies on detainee treatment created widespread confusion among the U.S. military and intelligence community.  This created a climate that experts say led to instances of abuse of suspected terrorists in U.S. custody in Iraq, left America at risk while intelligence officers had to put their intelligence collection efforts on hold, and cost America one of its most valuable tools in the war on terror – the power of its ideas, its example, and its leadership.  Further, these legally-suspect policies have led to delays in efforts to bringing terrorists to justice: more than five years into the war on terrorism, the Bush Administration has yet to try a single terrorist suspect.  The Supreme Court, appointed military lawyers, human rights groups and civil rights organizations continue to publicly challenge the legality and fairness of the policies established by the Bush Administration for interrogating, detaining, and prosecuting suspected terrorists in Iraq. (ACLU, Report to the Committee Against Torture, 4/27/06; Colin Powell, Letter to Senator John McCain, 9/13/06)