“It is the proper duty of
a representative body to look diligently into every affair of government and to
talk much about what it sees. It is meant to be the eyes and the voice, and to
embody the wisdom and will of its constituents…” — Woodrow Wilson
Congress has the
Constitutional responsibility to perform oversight of the Executive Branch and
matters of public interest. This report summarizes highlights from each week’s
Senate oversight hearings.
Tuesday, January 23, 2007: Senate Armed Services
Committee
“Nomination of Lieutenant
General David H. Petraeus, USA, to be General and Commander, Multi-National
Forces-Iraq”
- General Petraeus believes
that the situation in Iraq has deteriorated significantly over the last
year, that elections actually deepened the sectarian divide, and that the
Iraqi government has had difficulty gaining traction.
- General
Petraeus welcomed the invitation to provide the Senate with periodic
updates and vowed to provide an honest assessment of the strategy’s
ongoing likelihood for success.
- General Petraeus pledged
to alert the committee if he believes that civilian leaders are providing
inaccurate or misleading information.
Tuesday, January 23, 2007: Senate Select Committee on
Intelligence
“Open Hearing:
Intelligence Reform”
- Senator Bond
noted that none of the agencies in the intelligence community can provide
an unqualified, auditable financial statement.
- The
Office of the Director of National Intelligence promised to provide an
assessment of how many contractors were employed by the intelligence
community, and whether any of those roles should instead be performed
in-house.
- Senator
Rockefeller made clear that the Intelligence Committee expects full and
forthright answers from Executive Branch witnesses.
Tuesday,
January 23, 2007: Senate Foreign Relations Committee
“Securing America’s
Interests in Iraq: The Remaining Options: Alternative Plans (Continued) –
Federalism, Side with the Majority, Strategic Redeployment, or Negotiate?”
- A
credible threat of withdrawal will prompt the warring factions to reach a
political settlement.
- All
witnesses agreed that the military surge proposed by the President is the
extension of a failed strategy and will only prolong the violence there.
- The
Maliki government is not a reliable partner in attempting to reach a
political settlement in Iraq.
Tuesday,
January 23, 2007: Senate Foreign Relations Committee
“Securing America’s
Interests in Iraq: The Remaining Options: Alternative Plans (Continued)”
- Former Speaker Newt Gingrich
contended that the president’s plans in Iraq are breathtakingly
inadequate.
- Both Chairman John Murtha
and Speaker Gingrich believe that our military forces have been
overextended in ways that make America less secure.
- Both witnesses offered
concrete ideas about the path forward in Iraq.
- Speaker Gingrich
emphasized the need for the White House to adopt a bipartisan approach to
foreign policy.
Wednesday,
January 24: Senate Foreign Relations Committee
“Business Meeting”
- The Senate Foreign
Relations Committee passed a bipartisan resolution on Iraq.
- There is growing
bipartisan consensus that the Bush Administration’s escalation plan will
not achieve success in improving the security situation in Iraq and may
effectively undermine efforts to foster political reconciliation.
- Committee Republicans
voiced their opposition to the President’s escalation plan.
Thursday,
January 25, 2007: Senate Armed Services Committee
“The Current Situation in
Iraq and the Administration’s Recently Announced Strategy for Continued United
States Assistance to the Iraqi Government and for an Increased United States Military
Presence in Iraq”
- Witnesses agreed that
meaningful change in Iraq will not be achieved unless the Iraqis
understand that serious consequences, including withdrawal of U.S. forces,
will result from their failure to deliver on promised commitments.
- Former Secretary of
Defense William Perry, a member of the Iraq Study Group, warned that the
conflict in Iraq is seriously damaging U.S. military readiness.
- Retired General Jack Keane
testified that the situation in Iraq was “of crisis proportions” and
testified that the Administration’s political and military strategies has
failed.
- All witnesses expressed
grave concern that the President’s surge plan failed to provide for unity
of command of American and Iraqi troops.
Thursday,
January 25, 2007: Senate Foreign Relations Committee
“Securing America’s
Interests in Iraq: The Remaining Options:
Reconstruction Strategy”
- De-Baathification reform –
an initiative vital for addressing the sectarian conflict and
consolidating a viable national government in Iraq – is being led by Ahmed
Chalabi, a convicted felon, with highly suspect political and sectarian
allegiances.
- While the Bush
Administration moves to escalate U.S. involvement in Iraq, our coalition
partners continue to reduce their role.
- The Bush strategy in Iraq
continues to be guided by vague, unquantifiable standards.
General Petraeus believes
that the situation in Iraq has deteriorated significantly over the last year,
that elections actually deepened the sectarian divide, and that the Iraqi
government has had difficulty gaining traction.
GEN.
PETRAEUS: The situation in Iraq has deteriorated significantly since the
bombing this past February of the Al-Askari Mosque in Samarra, the third
holiest Shia Islamic shrine. The increase in the level of violence since then,
fueled by the insurgent and sectarian fighting that spiraled in the wake of the
bombing, has made progress in Iraq very difficult and created particularly
challenging dynamics in the capital city of Baghdad.
Indeed,
many Iraqis in Baghdad today confront life-or-death stay- or-leave decisions on
a daily basis. They take risks incalculable to us just to get to work, to
educate their children and to feed their families.
In
this environment, Iraq’s new government, its fourth in 3.5 years, has found it
difficult to gain traction. Though disappointing, this should not be a
surprise. We should recall that after the liberation of Iraq in 2003 every
governmental institution in the country collapsed.
A
society already traumatized by decades of Saddam’s brutal rule was thrown into
complete turmoil, and the effects are still evident throughout the country and
in Iraqi society.
Iraq
and its new government have been challenged by insurgents, international
terrorists, sectarian militias, regional meddling, violent criminals,
governmental dysfunction and corruption.
Iraq’s
security forces and new governmental institutions have struggled in this
increasingly threatening environment and the elections that gave us such hope
actually intensified sectarian divisions in the population at the expense of
the sense of Iraqi identity.
In
this exceedingly difficult situation, it has proven very hard for the new
government to develop capacity and to address the issues that must be resolved
to enable progress.
The
escalation of violence in 2006 undermined the coalition strategy and raised the
prospect of a failed Iraqi state, an outcome that would be in no group’s
interest, save that of certain extremist organizations and perhaps states in
the region that wish Iraq and the United States ill.
In
truth, no one can predict the impact of a failed Iraq on regional stability,
the international economy, the global war on terror, America’s standing in the
world and the lives of the Iraqi people.
General
Petraeus welcomed the invitation to provide the Senate with periodic updates
and vowed to provide an honest assessment of the strategy’s ongoing likelihood
for success.
GEN.
PETRAEUS: …I will provide my bosses and you with forthright, professional
military advice with respect to the missions given to Multi-National Force-Iraq
and the situation on the ground in Iraq. In that regard, I would welcome
opportunities to provide periodic updates to this body.
Beyond
that, I want to assure you that should I determine that the new strategy cannot
succeed, I will provide such an assessment. If confirmed, this assignment will
be my fourth year-or-longer deployment since the summer of 2001, three of those
to Iraq.
…
SEN.
LEVIN: All right. Now, we understand from columnist David Broder and from
what you’ve said here this morning that you’re willing to provide a regular
report every couple weeks on Iraqi progress on meeting the agreed-upon
benchmarks. Is that accurate?
GEN.
PETRAEUS: Sir, I’d be happy to provide updates to this body on whatever basis.
I’d like to make sure it’s long enough so that it’s meaningful and yet
certainly short enough so that you can keep track of what’s going on.
General
Petraeus committed to providing the committee with details of the benchmarks
that the President has referenced.
SEN.
LEVIN: Well, the president has referred to benchmarks. He has said that the
Iraqis have agreed to benchmarks and that we will hold the Iraqis to those
benchmarks. Have you seen the benchmarks the president...
GEN.
PETRAEUS: Yes, that’s correct. I know what you’re talking about, sir, in
terms of what they have agreed to provide in terms of the military forces in
Iraq, money for the reconstruction, money for foreign military sales and so
forth. Yes, sir.
SEN.
LEVIN: All right. Will you see to it that we get a copy of those benchmarks?
GEN.
PETRAEUS: Yes, sir.
…
SEN.
LEVIN: Now, I made reference in the letters just to political benchmarks, but
we’re going to insist -- and I use the word insist, and I think this will be a
bipartisan insistence. This is not a partisan issue. This is information this
committee’s entitled to, that Congress is entitled to. And I’m looking at you,
but I’m talking to the people at the Defense Department and State Department
who are within earshot here. We’re going to insist that we get copies of the
benchmarks on the political, economic and military aspects that have been
agreed to by the Iraqi government which the president has said he’s going to
insist that they comply with.
General
Petraeus acknowledges that he is not aware of conditions that the Iraqi
government must meet for the increase in U.S. troops to continue.
SEN.
LEVIN: So as of this time, do you know whether the flow of additional forces
is conditional upon the Iraqis keeping their political, economic and military
commitments?
GEN.
PETRAEUS: Sir, I do not believe that there are specific conditions that are
established. I know, again, that there is certainly a keen awareness of the
Iraqis and what it is that they are supposed to do.
General Petraeus
admitted concerns over the command-and-control relationship between U.S. and
Iraqi forces.
SEN.
MCCAIN: Do you understand the command and control relationships between the
American and Iraqi forces in this new plan? I’m very concerned about unity of
command.
GEN.
PETRAEUS: Sir, I share your concern. Again, on the one hand, though, we have
pushed Iraqis to do more, to take charge in many cases, and so we have, in
fact, almost a good news-bad news story. The good news is that the Iraqis are
willing to take command in many cases. The bad news is that that makes us have
to achieve unity of effort rather than unity of command. And that’s why we
have to have those relationships all the way up and down, with command posts
co-located and so forth to assure that.
SEN.
MCCAIN: We need to get that sorted out, General.
GEN.
PETRAEUS: Yes, sir.
SEN.
MCCAIN: I know of no successful military operation where you have dual command.
General
Petraeus indicated that we should be able to measure whether the President’s
strategy is a success by late summer.
SEN.
MCCAIN: In your judgment, what is a reasonable estimate of the time needed to
demonstrate whether these efforts are having success?
GEN.
PETRAEUS: Sir, under the current plan, as I understand it, the final brigade
would be operational in Iraq at the end of May. Giving them time to get
established, to understand the situation on the ground -- other forces will
have already certainly been moving into their areas of operation -- I would think
that we would have indicators at the least during the late summer of the
ability to clear and hold and then build in the Baghdad area and to secure that
population.
General
Petraeus acknowledged that the increase still provides too few troops for a proper
counterinsurgency operation, unless Iraqi security forces and private security
contractors are taken into account.
SEN.
MCCAIN: And yet your numbers, by any estimate or formula that you use, that
you’re receiving are either inadequate or bare minimum. Does that concern you?
GEN.
PETRAEUS: It does, sir. If you look at the counterinsurgency manual, for
example, and you have the one to 50 ratio of counterinsurgents to citizens, you’d
say that well, for Baghdad’s population, you should have somewhere around
120,000 security forces. If you add all of the U.S. forces that will be on the
ground when we have the full increase in forces, including special operations
forces, all the Iraqi forces, military and police, you get to about 85,000. Not
all of those are as effective as we might want them to be, particularly on the
police side, as you know.
However,
there are tens of thousands of contract security forces and ministerial
security forces that do, in fact, guard facilities and secure institutions and
so forth that our forces or coalition or Iraqi forces would otherwise have to
guard and secure, and so that does give me the reason to believe that we can
accomplish the mission in Baghdad with the additional forces.
…
SEN.
REED: Well, General, I was out there. I was shocked -- even Prime Minister
Maliki told me that some of these ministerial forces are worse than the
insurgents.
GEN.
PETRAEUS: Some indeed...
SEN.
REED: They’re disreputable. They’re involved with the sectarian killings. And
I don’t know, but does Blackwater work for you now?
GEN.
PETRAEUS: Blackwater does not work for me, although they’re under contract,
certainly, to a number of organizations. But as you’ve seen on your trips, for
example, the U.S. embassy is guarded by contract guards. My personal security
on my last tour was actually contracted out to -- I think it was a British
security firm so that we could free up the military police to secure my own
officers who did not have security provided for them. So again, that frees up
our forces, and it does that in numerous different places.
SEN.
REED: Well, General, that situation has existed before this surge, so these
additional forces -- I mean, I find it hard to believe that you would give as
your best advice to this committee that the differential -- probably 40,000
troops in terms of doctrine -- is going to be made up by ministerial forces in
Iraq that are generally unreliable and by private American contractors or other
contractors.
…
SEN.
REED: …One of the problems in any military operation -- not so often ground
combat forces -- it’s translators, civil affairs officers, people with the
cultural sensitivities you talked about so eloquently -- do you have adequate
enablers to do this new mission?
GEN.
PETRAEUS: Sir, that I don’t know. Again, if confirmed, that is high on my
list to determine if we have not just those enablers but also all of the combat
support and combat service support elements that you’ll recall from your own
service are so critical to enabling the soldier who’s on point.
SEN.
REED: But we are presenting this strategy as a new way forward with a new
plan, and a key element, as you indicate, you’re not quite sure we have those
forces in place or can generate those forces.
GEN.
PETRAEUS: Sir, I have talked to General Odierno about this -- again, not to be
presumptive, but in fact, when people consulted me during the -- in my previous
position during the development of the strategy, he assured me that they have
been looking very, very hard at the enablers, and that they think that they’re
going to be OK generally in the combat service support arena.
But
again, that’s something I have to confirm for myself, if confirmed, and once I
get on the ground.
General Petraeus
acknowledged that there is no time limit on the increase of U.S. forces in
Iraq.
SEN.
KENNEDY: You have in your manual long-term success depends on the people
taking charge of their own affairs, consenting to the government’s rule. What
is the time -- this number of soldiers now that are being sent over there --
how long are those soldiers going to be sent over there? We’ve heard words
about escalation. We’ve heard words of surge. Is this going to be permanent?
Is it temporary? What’s the time limitation that you can tell us about?
GEN.
PETRAEUS: Sir, I don’t know what the time limitation is at this point.
SEN.
KENNEDY: At this point, therefore, we should assume that they’ll remain over
there until we hear further from you.
GEN.
PETRAEUS: As they’re needed for that particular mission, yes, sir.
General Petraeus pledged
to alert the committee if he believes that civilian leaders are providing
inaccurate or misleading information.
SEN.
BILL NELSON: When you come to testify before us again with the civilian
leadership at your side, will you be silent if your civilian leaders provide
false or misleading information?
GEN.
PETRAEUS: No, sir.
…
SEN.
PRYOR: And I just had one follow-up question with Senator Bill Nelson. He
asked a few moments ago -- I think his question -- I wrote it down. I think I
have it right -- will you be silent if your civilian leaders provide false or
misleading information. I think that’s what he said. And you said no, you
would not remain silent, which is the right answer. But if you find yourself
in that situation where you have civilian leadership in this country that is
not providing accurate and true information, what will you do?
GEN.
PETRAEUS: Sir, I will provide accurate and true information. I think the
committee ought to know that, you know, I’d be very happy to stay on the banks
of the Missouri River at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas instead of going back to the
banks of the Euphrates River. And I’m doing this out of a sense of service,
again, to those great young men and women who are over there and because this
is what the military does. But this is not about being beholden to anyone. This
is not about, again, being aligned with any party or anyone else. I will give
you my best professional military advice. And if people don’t like it, then
they can find someone else to give better professional military advice.
General Petraeus pledged
to alert the committee if he did not have adequate troops or material to
accomplish his mission.
SEN.
BILL NELSON: Let me tell you about a conversation I had with our ambassador,
Khalilzad, and General Casey. And they both said -- this was back before
Christmas -- that they would not support a surge unless there’s a specific plan
for success. And the ambassador even said, and I quote, that he didn’t want
more American kids wasting their lives unless he had a high degree of
confidence in the plan. End of quote. Do you have a high degree of confidence
in this plan?
GEN.
PETRAEUS: Sir, I believe this plan can succeed if, in fact, all of those
enablers and all the rest of the assistance is, in fact, provided. And as I’ve
mentioned several times here today, I am determined to make sure that people
know that we have that. And again, in my periodic updates to this body I will
be happy to report whether that has been forthcoming or not.
General Petraeus agreed
that the debate in Congress does not undermine our troops’ morale.
GEN.
PETRAEUS: Sir, I think I stated earlier how important I think free and open
debate, the marketplace of ideas and all the other great qualities that our
country has achieved are, in fact, to our country. I think some of the
soldiers will be out there saying yeah, go get them. Some will be saying what’s
that all about. And some will just keep their head down and go about their
mission.
SEN.
BAYH: So what you’re saying, General, is that our men and women who wear the
uniform really are a lot like Americans back at home. They’ve got diverse
opinions, too.
GEN.
PETRAEUS: Sir, that’s where they come from.
SEN.
BAYH: And they’re probably sophisticated enough to take all this in and accept
it for whatever it’s worth.
GEN.
PETRAEUS: Sir, I think that’s an accurate statement.
Senator
Feinstein expressed concerns about the ongoing role of the Director for
National Intelligence (DNI) in the intelligence community.
SEN. FEINSTEIN: I have been very disappointed that the DNI has
not been really available and present and around. And that’s -- I’m just going
to say it -- was certainly not my view of what a DNI should be. I happen to
believe it was a mistake to prohibit co-location in the authorization bill, and
I will seek to change that. I believe to have a DNI out at Bolling makes no
sense. The DNI should be close to the agencies -- able to inter-relate with
the agencies. And I think because there’s not a lot of territorial imperative
in all this right now, we have a new head of service in terms of General
Hayden, General Alexander, General Clapper -- other things that are happening
that we have the opportunity now to make some of those changes. But I don’t
think we can have a DNI that is essentially isolated from the day-to-day operations
of the community.
Senator Bond
noted that none of the agencies in the intelligence community can provide an
unqualified, auditable financial statement.
SEN. BOND: It is 2007, and as best we know, not one, none, zero,
of the IC agencies can give us an unqualified financial statement. If I’m
wrong, please inform me; I would love to be proven wrong. In other words, they
can’t tell us where the money goes after we give it to you. I think the
taxpayers want us to fix that.
…
SEN. BOND: Just a couple of quick ones. I don’t believe I recall
getting a response to my question whether the IC has any auditable statement. Is
there any auditable statement in any entity in the IC?
MR. PATRICK KENNEDY, DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE FOR
MANAGEMENT: Senator, there is no auditable statement without exception. Two
agencies have achieved auditable financial -- have presented auditable
financial statements. However, exceptions were taken in the area of plants and
equipment -- i.e. inventories.
SEN. BOND: What were the two that made the hurdle?
MR. KENNEDY: Can I provide that to you offline, sir?
SEN. BOND: Yes, provide that to us. And when are you going to
get the rest of them controlled?
MR. KENNEDY: For the last year, we have been working with DOD and
with OMB on this. We have a very difficult problem that we’re facing in that
the majority of the funding for several of these agencies runs through the
Department of Defense and the Defense finance and accounting system. The
Defense finance and accounting system does not have an auditable financial
statement, which is beyond the control of the intelligence community, and until
we are able to achieve changes in that relationship, we are going to have a
problem.
The DNI’s
office promised to provide an assessment of how many contractors were employed
by the intelligence community, and whether any of those roles should instead be
performed in-house.
SEN. BURR: Mr. Chairman, I know my time is up. It is my
understanding at this time no one in the government can share with us
definitely how many contractors are employed by the intel community, or for
that fact, how many contractors are employed by DNI. I hope at some early date
in the future that, one, if that information is incorrect, ambassador, please
share it with me. If it’s not, I hope at the earliest possible time, we would
know what the extent of contractor usage is.
MR. KENNEDY: Mr. Chairman, may I have five seconds?
SEN. ROCKEFELLER: Provided that you answer tomorrow. (Scattered
laughter.)
MR. KENNEDY: We have just completed that exact
survey knowing that this is something that the DNI felt very specifically that
we needed to have to engage in solid management and prepare our budget submissions.
I have lots of raw data, Senator, and as soon as that data is in shape that I
can come and make an intelligence -- intelligent presentation, first, to your
staff, then to you, we will be getting that information up, because I think it
is important to know, and important to see if we are using contractors in the
right way. Are there things that should be contracted out that are not now? Or
things that are contracted out now, where the taxpayer would be better off if
they were brought in-house.
The DNI’s
office claimed that it has developed strategies to follow the eventual
re-deployment of forces.
SEN. FEINGOLD: The next question may seem a little ironic because
my whole concern has been that we don’t have the global reach. In fact, our
policy has become so Iraq-centric, that we haven’t had the opportunity to put
the resources around the world that we need. But I do want to talk about Iraq
in this context. It’s highly likely that the U.S. military forces will
withdraw from Iraq prior to the establishment of stability and the elimination
of terrorism there, so doesn’t it make some sense for the intelligence
community to have strategies in hand to deal with the challenges of Iraq as and
after we re-deploy our troops from there?
MS. MARGARET GRAHAM (DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE FOR
COLLECTION): Senator, I’ll speak for the collections side of the business, but
I think there has been development of those strategies. Again, this is
something we would be happy to talk to you about in as much detail as you or
your staff would like in a classified session.
The DNI’s
office says that the Maliki government’s task of achieving security and
stability is “very difficult,” but not impossible.
MR. THOMAS FINGAR (DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE FOR
ANALYSIS): …The very shorthand is, it would be very difficult for the Maliki
government to do this, but not impossible. And the logic that we have applied
looks at the importance of security. Security as an impediment to
reconciliation, as an impediment to good governments, and an impediment to
reconstruction.
We judge that Maliki does not wish to fail in his role. He does
not with to preside over the disintegration of Iraq. He has some, but not all,
of the obvious requirements for success. The judgement is that gains in stability
could open a window for gains in reconciliation among and between sectarian
groups and could open possibilities for a moderate coalition in the legislature
that could permit better governments. There’s a lot of conditional statements
in this analysis. But that it is not impossible, though very difficult.
Senator
Rockefeller made clear that the Intelligence Committee expects full and
forthright answers from Executive Branch witnesses.
SEN. ROCKEFELLER: Thank you, Senator Snowe. Ambassador Kennedy,
I’m going to pick a bone with you. And I think this is not unimportant,
because it gets to the very relationship of the way the congressional branch of
government and the executive branch of government talk with each other. We
have to be candid and forthright. I asked you about an absence in Michael
Hayden’s position when he took over the CIA. You indicated that General
Burgess was filling in on that and that everything was okay. I receded into a
state of temporary satisfaction until my chief of staff launched at my chair
and pointed out some very important things, which I think you need to think
about in terms of the way you and I talk in the future.
Number one is that he had two jobs. He was acting director of
intelligence. He was also responsible -- he was the deputy director for
requirements. So he was being asked to do two jobs at once. You did not tell
me that. No, I’m not finished.
And then, he ended his one job -- two jobs -- whatever you want --
two weeks ago. So my question stands. You cannot tell me in something as
important as what we are responsible for from an oversight position that
everything was just fine when in fact it wasn’t.
You can see he was a super-person and therefore could do the two
jobs at once. But I’m not inclined to believe that. So now, I want you to
correct the record for me and tell me whether there has been a deputy in
General Hayden’s position. There certainly has not been for the last two
weeks, and there certainly was not -- in my judgment -- for the previous period
of time. And those were very, very important times at which Iran and all kinds
of things reared their head.
MR. KENNEDY: Absolutely, Senator. And I apologize for something
I didn’t add. During the period of time that General Burgess was acting as the
principal deputy director of national intelligence, he stepped out of his job
as the deputy director for requirements, and Mr. Mark Ewing stepped into his
job as the acting director of requirements. And so, I apologize for failing to
add that to the point in my presentation, sir. I apologize for leaving that
off.
But, General Burgess was not occupying and doing the two jobs at
the same time. He was filling in. He moved out of his office -- literally,
physically moved out of his office as the deputy director for requirements --
and moved into the principal deputy’s office -- a different office adjacent to
Director Negroponte’s.
SEN. ROCKEFELLER: I will give you an advantage on facts. I will
not give you an advantage on the principle of discourse between the executive
branch and the congressional branch.
MR. KENNEDY: Again, I apologize for any misstatement I may have
made, but I thought I was honestly trying to outline that General Burgess had
shifted and had taken over as the acting deputy.
SEN. ROCKEFELLER: But you didn’t.
MR. KENNEDY: For the president’s designation.
SEN. ROCKEFELLER: But you didn’t.
MR. KENNEDY: I apologize.
SEN. ROCKEFELLER: Who is deputy now?
MR. KENNEDY: The job is vacant because the Vacancies Act time has
expired, as I indicated.
SEN. ROCKEFELLER: And then you referred obliquely to -- not
tensions but discussions. And all of that interests me. All I’m saying is
that when you and I converse, let it be open; let it be forthright; and let it
be accurate. Our business is intelligence. Yours is intelligence. So let’s
at least us deal with each other fairly.
A
credible threat of withdrawal will prompt the warring factions to reach a
political settlement.
LESLIE GELB (PRESIDENT EMERITUS, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN
RELATIONS): Now, the withdrawal process opens up political doors for us that
reinforce this decentralization or federal idea. In the first place, it allows
us to move toward an alliance with many of the Sunnis in the center of that
country with the Baathists, with the sheikhs and with the secular leaders of
that society. Because once they see we’re not going to be there and remain
their central enemy, they can band with us against the common enemy, the
terrorists in their midst: the Jihadis, the Al Qaida people…The same goes with
the Shias. Once they see that we’re in the process of leaving, we can develop
common interests with them as well. These are, in the last analysis, Iraqi
Arab Shias, not Iranian Persian Shiites. And there’s an important historical
difference there…So there’s area for us to work with once they see we’re not
going to be a permanent military presence.
SEN. MENENDEZ: Do you believe that we need to have
benchmarks with consequences?
LAWRENCE KORB (SENIOR FELLOW, CENTER FOR AMERICAN
PROGRESS): Very definitely, because if we do not, then the Iraqis will avoid
making these painful political compromises that we spoke, because they are
difficult. They want to remain in power and keep the government together. So
without these benchmarks, they’ll continue as they have. Let me make a point,
which I think is very important: They had their elections over a year ago. In
that time, we have lost a battalion’s worth of soldiers and Marines, killed or
wounded while they’ve been dithering. They promised to modify the constitution
four months after the election. We’re now 13 months. We have seen for the
last five years: Give us six more months, give us three months, and things will
change. How many times do we have to do it? So I think, yes, you need to have
benchmarks. If you don’t, there’s no way in which you can use whatever
leverage we have left to get them to do what they need to do.
All
witnesses agreed that the military surge proposed by the President is the
extension of a failed strategy and will only prolong the violence there.
EDWARD LUTTWAK (SENIOR FELLOW, CENTER FOR STRATEGIC
AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES): So what are we having? We’re having a civil war in
the remaining areas where the populations haven’t been sorted out. Sorting out
is what civil wars do. And when they finish, the civil war ends and you have a
civil peace. The United States had the Civil War. England had the civil war.
Even the Swiss Confederation had the civil war before they reached peace. And
I believe that, by interfering with the civil war, we are prolonging it. And by
trying to direct it and we decide how they should organize their affairs, we
are intruding in matters that we cannot manage successfully. And, therefore, I
believe that disengagement is the right way to go. I believe that
disengagement is also sustainable. Surge is not sustainable.
KORB: I think it’s important to keep in mind that
what we have to do is select an option that gives us the best chance of
protecting overall American security interests. And I would argue, as I do in
my prepared statement, that surging militarily for the third time in a year is
the wrong way to go. We should surge diplomatically. I support the comments
that were made to you last week about a further military surge by Generals Hoar
and McCaffrey that it’s too little too late and a fool’s errand, because what
it would mean -- in my view -- is merely repeating a failed strategy. We’ve
seen that when we surged twice in the last six months, the violence and death
of Americans and Iraqis has increased dramatically. An increased surge would
only create more targets, put more American lives at risk, increase Iraqi
dependence on the United States, further undermine the precarious readiness of
our ground forces.
ROBERT MALLEY (DIRECTOR, MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA
PROGRAM, INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP): …I think what’s important, given all
that, is to cut to the chase and to be blunt and frank. It’s very hard, today,
to imagine a positive outcome to this war. What we do know is that mere
tinkering is not going to lead to success. And what we do know is that only a
clean break -- a dramatic change in our approach to Iraq, to the government and
to the region -- present a possible chance of getting out of this in a stable
way…If the administration is not prepared to undertake a clean break, or if our
Iraqi allies are not prepared to undertake a clean break, we should stop
pretending that we’re in Iraq for a useful purpose. We should stop squandering
our resources. We should stop losing the lives of young men and women. We
should bring this tragic episode to a close.
Unfortunately, the plan that President Bush put on
the table does not meet the test of a clean break. There are some welcome
changes, most of them overdue. But in its underlying assumptions, it basically
is: Stay the course plus 20,000 -- its underlying assumptions about the Iraqi
government, about our role and about the region.
In other words, it’s an inadequate answer to a
disastrous situation that, at best, is going to delay what only a radical
course correction could prevent.
…
Now, in a broader sense, what we’re doing is
interposition. We are trying to interpose ourselves. And yet, we cannot
prevent the attacks. Why? Because the attacks are carried out by elusive,
unstable, low-contrast targets that we cannot see. We cannot hold them up. They
go right through the checkpoints, because they look like anybody else. And
then they kill people. Now, in other words, if I believed that the current
troop level will prevent mass deaths, I would never recommend its reduction. If
I believed a surge could reduce deaths, I would be very hesitant to speak
against it -- correctly, on humanitarian grounds. It is our duty.
However, I’m convinced that because, tactically,
there’s no relationship within the troop presence and the casualties and
victims, that this is no relationship. And, moreover, I note that the fighting
that’s taking place, the terrorism that’s taking place, is over disputed
zones. And by interposing ourselves, we are creating those disputed zones, or
at least preserving them.
The
Maliki government is not a reliable partner in attempting to reach a political
settlement in Iraq.
GELB: The administration has tried, for over three
years now, to build a strong central government. It has not worked. It will
not work, because there are not sufficient common interests. And there’s
almost total lack of trust. That government is inefficient and corrupt. Most
of the ministers -- and I know you’ve all been there -- don’t even leave the
Green Zone to go to their ministries to run their departments.
MALLEY: [T]o end the sectarian fighting, the
president’s plan relies on the Iraqi government and our allies in Iraq, who are
parties to the sectarian conflict. And that’s been evident -- to us, at least
-- for at least the last two years. It hasn’t started only in 2006, as Larry
Korb rightly pointed out.
There is no government of national unity. We may
talk about it; there is no such thing. It’s not a partner in our efforts to
stabilize Iraq. It hasn’t been a partner in our efforts to stem the violence. It’s
one side in a growing and every-day-dirtier civil war. We need to impose real
conditionality, real toughness, including on those who we brought to power --
in particular on those that we’ve brought to power. And we need to get them to
adhere to a real vision for Iraq or, again, we should get out of that business.
A
diplomatic surge is a much more effective strategy than a military surge.
KORB: Now, the diplomatic surge that we urge would
involve appointing an individual with the stature of former Secretary of State
Colin Powell or Madeleine Albright as a special envoy. This individual would
be charged with getting all six of Iraq’s neighbors -- Iran, Turkey, Syria,
Jordan, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait -- involved more constructively in stabilizing
Iraq. It’s important to note that all of these countries are already involved
in a bilateral, self-interested and disorganized way. And in addition, this
distinguished envoy should convene a Dayton-style conference to get all of the
factions in Iraq as well as all the countries in the region together.
Now, a lot of people will argue: Why would countries
like Iran and Syria, whose interests are not identical to ours, want to get
involved in such a conference?
Remember that, after we leave -- and if we set a date
certain -- they do not want Iraq to become a failed state or a humanitarian
catastrophe that will involve sending millions of refugees into their country,
or a haven for terrorists. Remember that if Iraq should become -- as some
people argue, that when we leave -- a haven for groups like Al Qaida, this
would not be in the interests of a country like Iran.
GELB: To me diplomacy is absolutely essential. But
you can’t talk about diplomacy as if to do it represents American weakness. And
I think that’s a fundamental mistake that the administration is making. Diplomacy
is going to give us answers to questions we don’t really have good answers to
right now. That’s why you engage.
We’ve engaged with some of our worst enemies
throughout our history. And we prevent some things from getting worse. And we
begin to use American power through diplomacy. And we shouldn’t be afraid of
doing it.
U.S.
involvement in Iraq has damaged morale in the Guard and Reserve and their
future readiness.
KORB: If, in fact, this surge becomes permanent, you’re
going to keep 21,500 more troops in Iraq over the long term, you’re going to
have to mobilize Guard and Reserve units who’ve already been mobilized at least
once.
As they say, when I was in the building, our policy
was not to mobilize them for more than one year out of every five, because the
data showed, if you do that, you’re going to lose a lot of the people. If you
take a man or woman who’s in the Guard, and you want to take more than 20
percent of their time away from their civilian career, they’re simply not going
to stay. They might as well join the active forces. So you’re going to have
to mobilize units again that have already been mobilized at least once for
close to two years since September 11th. And I think, if you do that, that
will bring about this death spiral. In my testimony, I urge Congress to
clarify the law and force the president to come back if he wants to remobilize
those units again and present the reasons.
Let me put it very bluntly. I think we have missed
something in this whole war. When we created the volunteer military, the idea
was that we would have a small active army and that Guard and Reserve would be
a bridge to conscription, to the draft, if we had a long ground war. That was
the idea. What has happened is the Guard and Reserve have become an adjunct to
the active force, and we haven’t even thought about going back to the draft.
It’s important to remember, this is the first extended conflict we’ve ever had
where we have not had conscription, and we have actually lowered taxes, not
raised taxes. And so I say, you know: As you look at this, you need to
understand you misused the Guard and Reserve. This was not what we intended
for the Army Guard and Reserve.
Speaker Gingrich
contended that the president’s plans in Iraq are breathtakingly inadequate.
SPEAKER
GINGRICH: The current strategy debate once again focuses too much on the
military and too little on everything that has not been working…The great failures
in the Iraq and Afghanistan campaigns have been in noncombat power --
intelligence, diplomacy, economic aid, information operations, support from the
civilian elements of national power…The gap between the president’s recent
proposals and the required rethinking and transforming of our noncombat
instruments of power is simply breathtaking.”
Speaker Gingrich said
that the problems in Iraq are the result of the administration’s failures.
SPEAKER
GINGRICH: [Y]ou had to do one of two things immediately after you occupied
Baghdad. You either had to hire the Iraqi army, which is what I favored, and
immediately -- because I didn’t want an occupation -- or you had to do what
Central Command had always planned, which was put about 400,000 people in so
you had physical presence everywhere. They adopted the worst of both worlds. They
had the right size army to not be an occupation, and then sent in Ambassador
Bremer to be an occupied leader, giving speeches on television. I mean, if you’re
going to do that, you’d better be so overwhelmingly dominant that nobody
becomes an insurgent because it’s physically impossible. So we literally
created a mess that was unnecessary.
Both Chairman Murtha and Speaker Gingrich
believe that our military forces have been overextended in ways that make
America less secure.
CHAIRMAN
MURTHA: Our strategic reserve is in desperate shape. While we are fighting an
asymmetric threat in the short term, we have weakened our ability to respond to
what I believe is a grave long term conventional and nuclear threat. At the
beginning of the Iraq war, 80 percent of ALL Army units and almost 100 percent
of active combat units were rated at the highest state of readiness. Today,
virtually all of our active-duty combat units at home and ALL of our guard
units are at the lowest state of readiness, primarily due to equipment
shortages resulting from repeated and extended deployments to Iraq. We must
make it a national priority to re-strengthen our military and to repair
readiness.
SPEAKER
GINGRICH: While I disagree with Chairman Murtha on some things, I could not
agree with him more strongly on the need to develop and strengthen a larger
military, and particularly a larger Army and Marine Corps. And there, I think
those who have advocated a larger system have proven to be entirely right, and
those who are trying to defend getting along with an inadequate system have
been proven, I think, decisively wrong.
Both Chairman Murtha and
Speaker Gingrich argued that there is no purely military solution in Iraq.
CHAIRMAN
MURTHA: There are limits to military power, and I’ve said this over and over
again. There is no military solution to Iraq’s civil war. It’s up to the
Iraqis.
SPEAKER
GINGRICH: The key to this is not simply military power. It’s an entire range
of things, many of which have to be driven from the White House if they’re
going to be effective….I don’t think combat forces are the key to this.
Both witnesses offered
concrete ideas about the path forward in Iraq.
CHAIRMAN
MURTHA: If we’re going to achieve stability in Iraq and in the region, I
believe the first step is to redeploy American forces, the execution of a
robust diplomatic effort and a restoration of our international credibility,
the repairing of our military readiness and the rebuilding of our strategic reserve
to face future threats….How do we restore international credibility? I believe
that it’s necessary for the U.S. to completely denounce any aspirations of
building permanent U.S. bases -- military bases in Iraq. I believe we should
shut down Guantanamo detention facility. We must bulldoze Abu Ghraib just
because of the symbolism of it. We must clearly articulate and demonstrate a
policy of, “no torture, no exceptions,” and directly engage countries in the
region with dialogue instead of directives. This includes allies as well as
our perceived enemies.
SPEAKER
GINGRICH: I think that there are two large-scale strategies that people up
here should be exploring. Neither one’s easy. One is, what will it take us to
succeed? And here we disagree on whether it’s even possible. But what would it
take? But the other is, if we are determined, if we decide, for whatever
reason, that we truly cannot succeed, then how do you manage the consequences? …Because
we’ve got to be prepared I think, almost like an option play in football, we’ve
got to be prepared either to drive to victory or to manage the cost of defeat
and understand that this is just the nature of the world we’re caught in.
Speaker Gingrich
emphasized the need for the White House to adopt a bipartisan approach to
foreign policy.
SPEAKER
GINGRICH: The president should ask the bipartisan leaders of Congress to
cooperate in establishing a joint legislative executive working group on
winning the war, and should openly brief the legislative branch in the problems
which are weakening the American system abroad. Only by educating and
informing the Congress can we achieve the level of mutual effort and mutual
support that will be needed for a generation if we are to save this country
from the threats that exist….Having the kind of effort to reach out and develop
a bipartisan national strategy in the way that Democratic President Truman and
Republican Senator Vandenberg laid the base for a 44-year containment strategy
I think is probably the most important national security challenge this country
faces.
The Senate Foreign
Relations Committee continued its extensive efforts to consider alternative
paths forward in Iraq.
SEN.
BIDEN: We have heard specific recommendations from 18 witnesses in the past
two weeks, and we’ll hear specific recommendations over the next two weeks. So
much for Vice President Cheney’s assertion that members of the Congress, quote,
“have absolutely nothing to offer,” in place of the current policy. For a
White House that has grown accustomed to policy debates in an echo chamber,
dismissing competing ideas has become a matter of routine, but it’s a dangerous
way to govern and conduct this war….Make no mistake: There are a number of very
serious people with very specific alternatives that have been offered.
The Senate Foreign
Relations Committee passed a bipartisan resolution on Iraq.
By
a vote of 12-9, the Foreign Relations committee approves S Con Res 2, A
Resolution Expressing the Bipartisan Resolution on Iraq, opposing an
increase of U.S. military presence in Iraq and calling for a new way forward,
focusing on political reconciliation, increased diplomacy and greater regional
and international support.
There is growing
bipartisan consensus that the Bush Administration’s escalation plan will not
achieve success in improving the security situation in Iraq and may effectively
undermine efforts to foster political reconciliation.
SEN.
BIDEN: [T]his amendment is designed to let the president know that there are
many in both parties, Democrats and Republicans, who believe that change in our
mission to go into Baghdad in the midst of a civil war, as well as surging
troops to lay the groundwork for a new Iraqi political solution, is the wrong
way to go, and in fact I believe will have the opposite -- emphasize “the
opposite” -- effect that the president intends.
The Bush Administration
still lacks a comprehensive strategy for success in Iraq.
SEN.
HAGEL: I don’t know how many United States senators believe we have a coherent
strategy in Iraq. I don’t think we’ve ever had a coherent strategy. In fact,
I would even challenge the administration today to show us the plan that the
president talked about the other night. There is no plan. I happen to know
Pentagon planners were on their way to the Central Com over the weekend. They
haven’t even team B’ed this plan. And my dear friend Dick Lugar talks about
coherence of strategy. There is no strategy. This is a ping-pong game with
American lives. These young men and women that we put in Anbar province, in
Iraq, in Baghdad are not beans. They’re real lives. And we better be damn sure
we know what we’re doing, all of us, before we put 22,000 more Americans into
that grinder. We better be as sure as you can be. And I want every one of you,
every one of us, 100 senators to look in that camera, and you tell your people
back home what you think. Don’t hide anymore; none of us. That is the essence
of our responsibility. And if we’re not willing to do it, we’re not worthy to
be seated right here. We fail our country. If we don’t debate this, if we don’t
debate this, we are not worthy of our country. We fail our country.
Senate Democrats and
Republicans want real leadership and a smart strategy in Iraq.
SEN.
HAGEL: America needs American -- the world needs American leadership. And
this is not about isolationism. This is not about pulling American troops out
of the Middle East. None of that. This is about a smart way to project our
military using the comprehensive framework of diplomacy as part of that. That’s
exactly what the Baker-Hamilton commission was about. The 79 recommendations
-- and I would recommend that those of you who’ve not read those 79
recommendations, should read them. These were from 10 very eminent Republicans
and Democrats that came up with these recommendations. There’s where we should
go back to. There’s where the bipartisan consensus is to go forward.
Committee Republicans
voiced their opposition to the President’s escalation plan.
SEN.
LUGAR: I am not confident that President Bush’s plan will succeed.
Militarily, the plan may achieve initial successes, but the premise that
clearing and building high-risk areas of Baghdad will create enough space for
an effective political reconciliation -- I fear that idea is dubious. The plan
is likely to be encumbered by the unwillingness of the Iraqi government to
confront Shia militias; the questionable loyalty of many Iraqi army and police
units; the resilience of the Sunni insurgency; the meddling of Iran; the
ineffectual history of our economic aid; and the political and military limits
of our abilities to hold indefinitely large swathes of urban landscape in
hostile circumstances.
SEN.
SUNUNU: I don’t think that we should make a commitment to deploy additional
troops until Iraqis have delivered on their promises. I don’t think that U.S.
troops are best suited to take the lead in dealing with sectarian violence.
SEN.
COLEMAN: For some of us, and at least for me, the bad idea, the thing that I’m
deeply concerned about is putting American troops in the middle of this -- the
cross-hairs of this sectarian battle before the Iraqis have produced. Have the
Iraqis show me their commitment to reconciliation. Pass a national oil law. Start
getting money into Anbar province. I was in Anbar, and then the Marines there
are saying, “We can’t get money into Anbar for reconstruction because it’s a
Sunni province.” Show me a commitment to take on Muqtada al-Sadr, and equally
the insurgents and the Shia. Show me that. Show me a commitment to changing
rules of engagement. We’ve had surges before, and our folks go in there and
about to capture them; all of a sudden they get cut off. We’re told that will
all change. Show me.
SEN.
ISAAKSON: I think we need to be clear that, while we may have our differences
as members of the Senate, members of this Congress, we do not have any
difference in our support, funding-wise, for our men and women in harm’s way,
nor do we want to micro-manage what are the calls of the commander in chief, as
Chairman Biden so eloquently described, and whether you may surge or raise or
lower your troop levels because of back-filling and coming and coming out.
SEN.
CORKER: I will say that personally after listening to the testimony, I’m not
persuaded -- I’m not persuaded that adding 21,000 troops in Baghdad or in Iraq
is necessarily the best course of action, with all due respect. I’m not
necessarily persuaded that that is the right thing to do.
SEN.
MURKOWSKI: I think the motivation of each and every one of us is to figure out
a way forward, a way forward for us in Iraq, a way forward for the people of
Iraq to have the security. Nobody wants to see a failure. And to use the
president’s words from last night, he said, nobody voted for a failure in Iraq.
Nobody has anything to gain, politically or otherwise, to see this thing
fail.…I happen to disagree with the president on the surge. I don’t believe
that that is the most effective way for us to move forward at this point in
time.
Witnesses agree that there must be a “stark set of consequences” for the Iraqis, including
withdrawal of American forces, if they fail to follow through on their
commitments. These commitments include providing sufficient security forces to
partner with our troops, equal protection of Sunni and Shia neighborhoods, a
new law on de-Baathification, and reconstruction funds.
“So one option is can you forge a new national
compact. Will it come if there isn’t a set of consequences? I don’t think it
will come if there isn’t an unmistakable set of consequences. Maybe if the
president has privately warned Maliki about the consequences, maybe he’ll
change, maybe others will. If he hasn’t made that warning, then I would
suggest that the Congress should focus on how it can identify what would be key
consequences…the ones I would focus on are the provision of forces, not just
the law on the sharing of oil revenue, but the actual implementation of it, the
de-Baathification, the equal protection. Those strike me as being the most
important…Now, if that’s not done by this government, then, it seems to me, you
can be a in position to say the consequences, from the Congressional
standpoint, would be putting a cap on the forces, reducing security assistance,
because, in a sense, that was the crux of what the Iraqi Study Group was
suggesting -- fulfill your political responsibilities and we support you. Don’t
fulfill those political responsibilities, and, in a sense, we begin to reduce
our support for you.” (Prepared testimony of Ambassador Dennis Ross)
“I think they haven’t reached a political settlement
because the political group in power, the Shia, do not want to give up that
power. They’re not interested in political sharing and I understand why they
are not. So I believe that in order for them to be willing to share power,
there has to be substantial incentives for them to do it. And I thought it was
very important for our government to put both the negative and the positive
incentives to the Iraqi government, to make them face up, to take the actions
to do this very difficult task.” (Prepared testimony of former Secretary of
Defense William Perry)
Former Secretary of Defense William Perry, a member of the Iraq Study
Group, warned that the conflict in Iraq has seriously damaged U.S. military
readiness; specifically, Perry said the military’s “compact” with the “citizen
soldiers” of the National Guard has been “shattered by the extended
deployments.”
“The Army, all of whose brigades with high readiness
levels at the beginning of the war, is dangerously close to broken and, today,
less than a third of these forces are at readiness levels needed to meet
military contingencies, and low readiness levels invite such contingencies. Indeed,
our security has already suffered because of the perception of Iran and North
Korea that our forces are tied down in Iraq. The Defense Department also needs
to reconsider the role of the National Guard, since the compact with these
citizen soldiers has been shattered by the extended deployments, that have
caused many of them to lose their jobs and some of them to lose their families.”
(Prepared testimony of former Secretary of Defense William Perry)
Retired General Jack
Keane testified that the situation in Iraq is “of crisis proportions” and that
the Administration’s military and political strategies in that country has
failed.
“We all agree the situation in Iraq is grave, it’s of
crisis proportions, and time is running out for the Maliki government and,
also, for our own and our allies…The political strategy that we had, as
ambitious as it was, has failed to stem this violence…while everybody
understands the historical differences between Shia and Sunnis, the application
of those differences in everyday life in Iraq, I think, is something we
underestimated, as well. So in terms of not only understanding the political
structure, political culture, we rushed to a representative government and we
clearly do not have one and they have been incapable, because the Sunnis are
truly not participating to stop this violence…
The military strategy has also failed and it failed
in the sense that it did not stem the violence…We never had it as a mission,
ever, for the United States military to defeat the insurgency…The military made
a conscious decision to give that mission to the Iraqi security forces and
train them up to a level so that they could, in fact, defeat that insurgency,
and we have continued with that mission up until today. What is wrong with
that is that each succeeding year, the enemy exploited the fact that we were
never protecting the people. The only way you can reasonably defeat an
insurgency is by protecting the people and we made a conscious decision not to
do that and they exploited that conscious decision.” (Prepared testimony of
Retired General Jack Keane)
Iraqi Security Forces are not ready to shoulder the load of securing
Baghdad.
SEN. WARNER: Why couldn’t this mission, call it the
third Baghdad surge, been composed almost entirely of Iraqi forces, some
embedding on our areas, some support continuing, and then our forces, if we
bring new ones in country, to go into those geographic areas where their Iraqi
forces have been moved to Baghdad? Was that ever a consideration?
KEANE: Well, I think, yes, the answer to that is,
yes, it has been. And we relied on Iraqi security forces twice before in
Baghdad in those previous operations. Both of those operations failed. They
failed primarily because we relied too heavily on Iraqi security forces and we
did not have enough U.S. forces to be able to deal with it. So that’s number
one. Look, Senator, we’ve made some real progress with the Iraqis in terms of
the training programs that we have for their noncommissioned officers, their
officers, and their young soldiers and we put them in units together, give them
operational experience with advisers to do that. And I think the initiatives
to strengthen our advisory program and increase it make a lot of sense to me. But
the fact is, the overwhelming reality is those Iraqi security forces cannot
take on the lion’s share of this mission by themselves to be able to deal with
the level of violence that’s there. They still do not have the organizational
depth and breadth to deal with that. They don’t have the skill sets to deal
with all of that.
All witnesses agreed that the failure of the President’s plan to provide
for unity of command over American and Iraqi troops was unwise and dangerous.
SEN. LEVIN: Finally, General Keane, you’ve said that
it is unfortunate that there will not be unity of command of American forces in
Baghdad. You said it would be frustrating, those are the two words that you
have used, because General Petraeus is going to Baghdad with this dual command
structure. In addition to being unfortunate and frustrating, is it also
dangerous for our troops, unless there is unity of command?
KEANE: Yes, it is more dangerous. What will happen
is our commanders will mitigate that danger by establishing joint command posts
with the Iraqis and the maximum amount of liaison teams. You can work around
it, but usually, when we do an autopsy on why operations don’t succeed, many
times, this unity of command issue is one of the reasons why they do not
succeed. So it’s a fundamental precept and it’s unfortunate we have to deal
with it.
Prime
Minister Maliki has not demonstrated the political will necessary to reconcile
the warring parties and end the sectarian violence.
“I think the number of brigades, at this point, are
basically less relevant in some ways. I understand what General Keane was
saying about you need security first, but I’m looking for some manifestations
that there’s a political will to change behavior on the side of the Iraqis. The
fact is we are three and three quarters years into this war and, at this
juncture, I’m afraid what’s happened is that the sectarian divide has deepened.
And I look at what happened with the execution of Saddam Hussein.
Here was a moment for Mr. Maliki to send a signal to
the Sunnis that, “We are Iraqis now. We all suffered. We were all brutalized.
That was the past. We’re going to write a new chapter.” He could have sought
to reach out. He didn’t seek to reach out. So for me, the most important
measures at this point are what are the signs that there is a genuine decision
being made to act, with all the limitations. And I don’t doubt, by the way,
that Maliki has real limitations, but the fact is we need to see some
unmistakable manifestation that there’s a new political will to match what is
the will that we are now offering. If that’s the case, then I think then the
surge can work only in the context that you see some change in political
behavior.” (Prepared testimony of Ambassador Dennis Ross)
De-Baathification reform
– an initiative vital for addressing the sectarian conflict and consolidating a
viable national government in Iraq – is being led by Ahmed Chalabi, a convicted
felon, with highly suspect political and sectarian allegiances.
DAVID
SATTERFIELD (STATE DEPARTMENT COORDINATOR FOR IRAQ): The parliament is
responsible -- the Council of Representatives -- for de-Baathification. Ahmed
Chalabi is, indeed, in charge of the committee responsible for this program.
The
initial outlinings of the reforms proposed, frankly, are not adequate to meet
the needs of meaningful national reconciliation. They need to be changed. We
have had very direct conversations with Mr. Chalabi and others on this issue.
The prime minister has articulated publicly a very expansive intent with respect
to de-Baathification reform. But that expansive intent needs to be translated
from rhetoric into reality, and it needs to happen soon.
While the Bush
Administration moves to escalate U.S. involvement in Iraq, our coalition
partners continue to reduce their role.
SATTERFIELD:
On the coalition side, the coalition remains intact. Our critical partners:
the U.K., which has indicated a desire over the course of the next several
months, to reduce force levels to, I believe, 4,500, but to keep forces in Iraq
at least through the end of this year; Poland, which is similarly committed to
retaining its forces; El Salvador; the South Koreans -- our key partners are
not moving. But they are not engaged...
SEN.
HAGEL: They are moving. They’re reducing their forces.
SATTERFIELD:
But they’re not leaving.
The Administration
refuses to outline a contingency plan for securing Iraq.
SEN.
FEINGOLD: [D]oes the administration have a contingency plan if security and
economic and military efforts don’t work in this president’s new way forward?
SATTERFIELD:
Senator, I’ll answer that in two different parts. First, with respect to the
specific funding that we will be requesting, the projects -- the kinds of its
purposes were applying those monies to very much reflect the reality, the stark
reality of the security situation on the ground.
We’re
not engaging in projects we don’t believe can be completed and be completed by
Iraqis under the conditions that prevail today. We’re trying to change those
conditions, but we’re not blue-skying this. This is a very reality-based set
of programs.
The
second answer to your question, which is really, if I can take, you know --
what’s the plan B? We’re focused on making plan A a success. We believe it can
succeed, and we’re not going to discuss the alternatives -- that is the plan
for a less than successful option -- while we are trying now to initiate the
steps necessary to make our primary strategy succeed.
The Bush strategy in Iraq
continues to be guided by vague, unquantifiable standards.
SEN.
WEBB: you say that you will target -- or you will channel targeted assistance
to Iraqi leaders regardless of party or sectarian affiliation who reject
violence and pursue their agendas through peaceful democratic means. How are
you going to measure this? How are you going to quantify that?
SATTERFIELD:
There’s a very simple test: Are individuals engaged in violence as a pursuit of
their political or individual ambitions, or are they working through a
political process at a...
SEN.
WEBB: Who makes that determination? Who’s going to make that determination?
SATTERFIELD:
It is the U.S. officials on the ground, civilian and military -- in their
direct contacts on the ground -- who make that determination.
SEN.
WEBB: That’s a fairly vague standard, wouldn’t you agree?
SATTERFIELD:
No. I think it’s a very crisp standard. I think it is very clear who is
engaged in violence and who is engaged in the political process.
SEN.
WEBB: It’s only clear if you have adequate intelligence.
SATTERFIELD:
That’s correct, Senator. And we do have intelligence.
SEN.
WEBB: I think we’ve pretty well demonstrated throughout this war that, on the
ground, there is frequently inadequate intelligence.
SATTERFIELD:
Senator, the purpose of the expansion of the provincial reconstruction teams,
the additional pairing with our brigade commanders, is to enhance our ability
at a finer and finer level...
