Top Twenty Iraq Oversight Outrages Uncovered by the DPC

Republicans in Congress Refuse to Demand Accountability in Iraq;
Billions of Dollars Wasted, Our Mission Undermined

 

Over the last three years, Senate Democratic Policy Committee (DPC) hearings have uncovered massive waste, fraud, and abuse relating to government contractors operating in Iraq.  This report presents twenty of the worst oversight outrages, as documented in testimony and evidence presented at DPC hearings:

 

1)      Halliburton billed taxpayers $1.4 billion in questionable and undocumented charges under its contract to supply troops in Iraq, as documented by the Pentagon’s own auditors.  More…

 

2)      Parsons billed taxpayers over $200 million under a contract to build 142 health clinics, yet completed fewer than 20.  According to Iraqi officials, the rest were “imaginary clinics.”  More…

 

3)      Custer Battles stole forklifts from Iraq’s national airline, repainted them, then leased the forklifts back to the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) through a Cayman Islands shell company — charging an extra fee along the way.  More…

 

4)      Halliburton allowed our troops in Iraq to shower, bathe, and sometimes brush their teeth with water that tested positive for e. coli and coliform bacteria.  One expert has said that the troops would have been better off using the highly polluted Euphrates River.  Halliburton has admitted that it lacked “an organizational structure to ensure that water was being treated in accordance with Army standards and its contractual requirements.”  More…

 

5)      Halliburton served the troops food that had spoiled or passed its expiration date.  Halliburton managers ordered employees to remove bullets from food in trucks that had come under attack, then saved the bullets as souvenirs while giving the food to unwitting soldiers and Marines.  More…

 

6)      Halliburton charged taxpayers for services that it never provided and tens of thousands of meals that it never served.  More…

 

7)      Halliburton double-charged taxpayers for $617,000 worth of soda.  More…

 

8)      Halliburton tripled the cost of hand towels, at taxpayer expense, by insisting on having its own embroidered logo on each towel.  More…

 

9)      Halliburton employees burned new trucks on the side of the road because they didn’t have the right wrench to change a tire — and knew that the trucks could be replaced on a profitable “cost-plus” basis, at taxpayer expense.  More…

 

10)   Halliburton employees dumped 50,000 pounds of nails in the desert because they ordered the wrong size, all at taxpayer expense.  More…

 

11)   Halliburton employees threw themselves a lavish Super Bowl Party, but passed the cost on to taxpayers by claiming they had purchased supplies for the troops.  More…

 

12)   Halliburton chose a subcontractor to build an ice factory in the desert even though its bid was 800 percent higher than an equally qualified bidder.  More…

 

13)   Halliburton actively discouraged cooperation with U.S. government auditors, sent one whistleblower into a combat zone to keep him away from auditors, and put another whistleblower under armed guard before kicking her out of the country.  More…

 

14)   Halliburton sent unarmed truck drivers into a known combat zone without warning them of the danger, resulting in the deaths of six truck drivers and two soldiers.  Halliburton then offered to nominate the surviving truck drivers for a Defense Department medal — provided they sign a medical records release that doubled as a waiver of any right to seek legal recourse against the company.  More…

 

15)   Halliburton’s no-bid contract to rebuild Iraq’s oil infrastructure was the worst case of contract abuse that the top civilian at the Army Corps of Engineers had ever seen.  She was demoted after speaking out.  More…

 

16)   Under its no-bid contract to rebuild Iraq’s oil infrastructure contract, Halliburton overcharged by over 600 percent for the delivery of fuel from Kuwait.  More…

 

17)   Halliburton failed to complete required work under its oil infrastructure work, leaving distribution points unusable.  More…

 

18)   Iraq under the CPA was like the “Wild West,” with few limits and controls over how inexperienced officials spent — and wasted — millions of taxpayer dollars.  More…

 

19)   Cronies at the CPA’s health office lacked experience, ignored the advice of international health professionals, failed to restore Iraq’s health systems, and wasted millions of taxpayer dollars.  The political appointee who ran the office had never worked overseas and had no international public health experience.  More…

 

20)   Administration officials promoted construction of a “boondoggle” children’s hospital in Basra, which ended up more than a year behind schedule and at least 100 percent over budget.  More…

 

 

 

 

“[G]overnment auditors at the Defense Contract Audit Agency have identified more than $1 billion in ‘questioned’ Halliburton costs.  DCAA challenged most of these costs as “unreasonable in amount” after completing audit action because they ‘exceed that which would be incurred by a prudent person.’  The auditors found (1) $813 million in questioned costs under Halliburton’s Logistics Civil Augmentation Program (LOGCAP) contract to provide support services to the troops and (2) $219 million in questioned costs under the company’s Restore Iraqi Oil (RIO) contract to rebuild Iraq’s oil infrastructure.  The magnitude of these questioned costs significantly exceeds previously known estimates.  The DCAA auditors have also found that an additional $442 million in Halliburton’s charges are ‘unsupported.’  As a result, Halliburton’s total ‘questioned’ and ‘unsupported’ costs exceed $1.4 billion.” (Joint Report of Democratic Policy Committee and House Government Reform Committee Minority Staff, 6/27/2005)

 

 

 

Testimony of Ali Fadhil, Iraqi doctor and Fulbright Scholar, 7/28/2006:

 

QUESTION:  [Y]ou took a look at the projects that Parsons had done and you say shoddy workmanship, bad products, bad materials?  Is that a fair assessment?

FADHIL:  Yes, in fact, our first approach is to find out what Parsons exactly…what was more interesting for us is the one hundred fifty clinics, the super clinics…

QUESTION:  Right.

FADHIL:  Which then turned into one hundred forty-two.  But, in fact, when I went to the Ministry of Health, where I spent almost a month trying to find out where all these health clinics, simply the officials said: there are no clinics, they are imaginary clinics.

 

…

 

QUESTION:  You’re saying the other clinics don’t exist?

FADHIL:  The other clinics, there were only like…it’s just a building, it’s like a half-finished buildings: marble at the front, bricks at the side, you see inside it’s just a ghost building, you can’t find anything.  It’s just, as you said, it’s just bricks and walls.  That’s, that’s all that it is.

 

Parsons Completed Fewer Than 20 of 142 Clinics, Despite Spending $200 Million

 

“A reconstruction contract for the building of 142 primary health centers across Iraq is running out of money, after two years and roughly $200 million, with no more than 20 clinics now expected to be completed, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers says.” (Washington Post, 4/3/2006)

 

 

 

Custer Battles Employees Stole Forklifts From Iraqi Airways

 

“I wish that I could tell you that the Bush Administration has done everything it could to detect and punish fraud in Iraq.  If I said that to you, though, I would be lying.  In [the case of Custer Battles], the Bush Administration has not lifted a finger to recover tens of millions of dollars that our whistleblowers allege was stolen from the government.  While at the airport, Custer Battles found some abandoned Iraqi Airways forklifts.  They painted these over to hide the Iraqi Airways markings, and then billed them to the Government as ‘materials’ under a different contract.” (Alan Grayson, Attorney for Whistleblowers, DPC Hearing, 2/14/2005)

 

The Stolen Forklifts Were Sold Through a Cayman Islands Company For a “Double Mark-Up and Excessive Profits”

 

“Custer Battles also billed substantial sums for services and equipment that it either did not provide or did not own.  For example, Custer Battles arranged for certain heavy equipment, such as forklifts used for moving and warehousing the Iraqi currency, to be shown as being leased through [Cayman Islands companies]…for the purpose of fabricating a double mark-up and excessive profits.  At least one of the forklifts, and perhaps as many as six to eight…actually belong to Iraqi Airways.” (Complaint in United States Ex. Rel. DRC, Inc., Robert J. Isakson and William D Baldwin v. Custer Battles, LLC, et. al., 8/26/2004)

 

 

 

Military Doctors Have Confirmed the Presence of E. Coli Bacteria in Water That Our Troops Use to Shower and Bathe:

 

“Mr. Gist told [Lieutenant] Strating he had concerns that the [Reverse Osmosis Water Purification Unit (ROWPU)] concentrate reject was being used to fill the water tanks…after hearing this [Lieutenant] Strating investigated.  He went to the water treatment site and followed the lines from the ROWPU concentrate drain to water trucks filling up with this water.  He then followed this truck and observed it pumping the water into the water storage tank at PAD 206.  The PM team tested the water at the ROWPU concentrate distribution point.  The results are as follows:…Coliform Positive, E. coli Positive…After discovering that KBR was filling the water storage tanks with ROWPU concentrate, [Lieutenant] Strating gathered the base mayor ([Colonel] Grayson), the Q-West KBR site manager (Bernardo Torres), Rachel Vanhorn (KRB LNO), Mathew Wallace (KBR ROWPU Manager) and Bill Gist (water quality technician) to the ROWPU site and told them all at the same time that he had identified that KBR was filling the water storage tanks with ROWPU concentrate.  Mr. Wallace stated that it has always been done this way and there is not a problem with it.  [Lieutenant] Strating explained that it is against Army regulations (TB MED 577) to use ROWPU reject for personal hygiene.” (E-mail from Captain A. Michelle Callahan, Brigade Surgeon, 101^st Sustainment Brigade, 3/31/2006)

 

A Public Health Expert Has Testified that Soldiers Would Have Been Better Off Using Water Straight From the Polluted Euphrates River:

 

“In summary, the source water used for our soldiers at Ar-Ramadi was basically diluted sewage; highly polluted and completely unacceptable by any standard for being used without robust treatment.  In what appears to be a profound misunderstanding of the way a reverse osmosis unit works, concentrated untreated polluted water was provided to our soldiers for hygienic purposes that is highly likely to make them sick.  They would have been better off being provided with water straight from the Euphrates River.” (Testimony of Jeffrey K. Griffiths, Professor Public Health and Medicine, Tufts University School of Medicine, 4/7/2006)

 

The Defense Contract Management Agency Has Confirmed That Halliburton Failed to Follow Proper Water-Handling Procedures:

 

“[T]here was evidence suggesting that KBR was using outmoded and no-longer-valid procedures with regard to the obtainment and treatment of the water used for showering…On February 7, 2006, DCMA Northern Iraq issued to KBR a Corrective Action Request (CAR), citing questionable water-supply practices for non-potable water and prohibiting the use of brine water for any activities involving human contact.” (“Point Paper” provided by Defense Contract Management Agency, 4/17/2006)

 

According to Its Own Theater Water Quality Manager, Halliburton Has Failed to Test Water at Locations Across Iraq:

 

“I am also likely to believe that there is no documentation to support the 3x daily requirement for testing of shower/hygiene water (I apologize if I am wrong).  This is in TB MED 577 8-10.  This testing is required per our statement of work and I have yet to find an installation that does the required testing let alone has such documents to support their testing activities.” (E-mail from Wil Granger, 7/15/2005)

 

Halliburton’s Own Report Admitted That There Were Not Sufficient Safeguards To Ensure Water Quality

 

“During the investigation, the following were noted…KBR lacked an organizational structure to ensure that water was being treated in accordance with Army standards and its contractual requirements.”  (KBR Final Report:  Water Quality at Ar Ramadi, February 2006)

 

 

 

“Food items were being brought into the base that were outdated or expired as much as a year.  We were told by the KBR food service managers to use these items anyway.  This food was fed to the troops.  A lot of these were frozen foods: chicken, beef, fish, and ice cream.  For trucks that were hit by convoy fire and bombings, we were told to go into the trucks and remove the food items and use them after removing the bullets and any shrapnel from the bad food that was hit.  We were told to turn the removed bullets over to the managers for souvenirs.” (Rory Mayberry, Former KBR Food Production Manager, 6/27/2005)

 

 

 

Halliburton Charged for Meals Never Served

 

“KBR charged the government for meals it never served to the troops.  Until late 2003, Anaconda was a transition site for army personnel.  Because there could be large numbers of extra personnel passing through everyday, KBR would charge for a surge capacity of 5,000 troops per meal.  However, KBR continued to charge for the extra headcount even after Anaconda was no longer a transition site.  When I questioned these practices, the managers told me that this needed to be done because KBR lost money in prior months, when the government suspended some of the dining hall payments to the company.  The managers said that they were adjusting the numbers to make up for the suspended payments.” (Rory Mayberry, Former KBR Food Production Manager, 6/27/2005)

 

Halliburton inflated the headcount at its Morale, Welfare & Recreation Department

 

“At Camp Fallujah, I became concerned about several Halliburton practices.  The first concerns procedures use to compile the head count for the MWR department.  Funding for the MWR department was evidently based in part on the head count that Halliburton reported….Sometimes they used a sum total for the head count that was higher than the boots in the door, hourly room counts, activity count, equipment count and towel counts combined.  After adding together all of the numbers to arrive at a sum total, coordinators were instructed to throw away the original boots in the door sign-in sheets.  The larger sum total was then designated as the MWR head count for that day.  This figure was then e-mailed to Halliburton administrators who compiled the numbers for all MWR facilities.  There are many other Halliburton MWR coordinators who can verify this procedure.  This fraudulent head count can then equate to millions of dollars in unnecessary funding.  By inflating the number of users, Halliburton can rationalize a greater need for facilities, equipment, staffing and administrators than actually exists.  The additional staffing does not benefit the troops, but it does benefit Halliburton.  Under its contract, the more facilities, equipment, staff and administrators Halliburton can show a need for, the more profit Halliburton makes.  As the mantra at Halliburton camps goes, ‘It’s cost plus, baby.’” (Julie McBride, Former KBR Morale, Welfare & Recreation Employee, 9/18/2006)

 

 

 

“Soft drink (consumable soda) costs of about $617,000 on one task order for about 2,500 personnel were listed as a morale and welfare-related cost.  Not only was the cost associated with individual drinks excessive, but it duplicated soft drinks included as part of food service costs.” (U.S. Army Audit Agency Report, 11/24/2004)

 

 

 

“There also was a requisition for 2,500 towels for a MWR facility in Baghdad.  There were old quotes for ordinary towels.  The MWR manager changed the requisition by requesting upgraded towels with an embroidered MWR Baghdad logo.  He insisted on this embroidery, which you can see from this towel…The original purchase order for that, that I was discussing for these 2,500 towels was for towels at a price of .38KD which was roughly $1.60 a towel.  That towel [with the logo] would have cost around $4.50 and $5.50 per towel.” (Henry Bunting, Former Halliburton Employee, 2/13/2004)

 

 

 

Testimony of Richard Murphy, Iraq War veteran, 4/7/2006:

 

MURPHY:  We were conducting convoys from the South, from a base called Taleel and moving up North to Baghdad on a road in the middle of the desert, just about as safe as you can get in Iraq.  At one point, one of the trucks, one of the civilian trucks got a flat tire and they did not have the proper wrench to change the tire so the decision was made to torch the truck.

 

QUESTION:  Was it a new truck?

 

MURPHY:  Yes, Sir.

 

QUESTION:  So they did not have the proper wrench to change the tire so they made the decision to burn the truck?

 

MURPHY:  Yes, that was the story.

 

QUESTION:  I have heard that before but you actually saw the truck?

 

MURPHY:  Yes, Sir, I saw the truck.

 

 

 

Testimony of Henry Bunting, former Halliburton employee, 2/13/2004:

 

QUESTION:  And there’s another element here that talks about an order for 50,000 lbs of nails…Wrong nails, wrong product?

 

BUNTING:  They were nails that were too short.  And the —

 

QUESTION:  Fifty thousand pounds of nails that were too short?

 

BUNTING:  Fifty thousand pounds.

 

QUESTION:  Sitting in a warehouse —

 

BUNTING:  No, not even sitting in a warehouse.  Just sitting on the ground.  They didn’t even have warehousing facilities.

 

 

 

Halliburton Employees Threw Super Bowl Party With Big Screen TV “At Taxpayer Expense”

 

“Halliburton employees also exploit requisitions to obtain luxuries that are not afforded to the troops.  One example of this was a Super Bowl party for Halliburton employees only at taxpayer expense.  Halliburton requisitioned a big screen TV and lots of food for the private use of Halliburton employees.  Halliburton made money on this too.  Those same employees then arranged a live television connection for that big screen TV so that they could watch football games.  In my experience, many Halliburton employees, frankly, don’t seem to care much about the military.  They often ignored troop requests or treated them like an annoyance.  Those same employees, however, indulged their own whims at taxpayer expense.” (Julie McBride, Former KBR Morale, Welfare & Recreation Employee, 9/18/2006)

 

Senator Durbin Decried Halliburton’s Diversion of Resources Intended for the Troops

 

“What Mrs. McBride has told us about…is scandalous activity.  It is overcharging American taxpayers, charging them for things which were not provided to our troops, inflating their costs so they can make more money off of our taxpayers on their no-good multibillion-dollar contracts, taking goods which were meant for our troops and diverting them, according to your testimony, to Halliburton and KBR employees, for Super Bowl parties.”  (Sen. Richard Durbin, 9/18/06)

 

 

 

Testimony of Marie deYoung, former Halliburton employee, 9/10/2004:

 

QUESTION:  So there was a competition for building these ice factories.  Two bids were received.  One was for $3.4 million and one was for $450,000.  According to a memo from the subcontract administrator, these companies were equally qualified, except for the price difference.  Is that correct?

DEYOUNG:  That’s correct.

QUESTION:  And who was awarded the subcontract?

DEYOUNG:  The subcontractor who charged the higher amount, $3.4 million.  And if I may add, about $900,000 was tacked on for shipment.  [And] it actually cost the taxpayers $4 million higher because of the shipment charge.

 

 

Halliburton Discouraged Full Disclosure to Auditors

 

“When I was there, I heard that we had the auditors in and that we were not supposed to talk to the auditors; that was the quickest way home.” (Henry Bunting, Former Halliburton Employee, 2/13/2004)

 

Halliburton Sent a Whistleblower to Fallujah to Keep Him Away from Government Auditors

 

“I personally was sent to Fallujah for 3 weeks.  The manager told me I was being sent away until the auditors were gone because I had opened my mouth to the auditors.  When I returned from Fallujah, the convoy was attacked.  I was put in danger because the KBR managers didn’t want me to talk with U.S. government auditors.” (Rory Mayberry, Former KBR Food Production Manager, 6/27/2005)

 

Halliburton Put a Whistleblower under Armed Guard

 

Testimony of Julie McBride, Former KBR Morale, Welfare & Recreation Officer, 9/18/2006:

 

MCBRIDE:  When I went to Baghdad, I gave an administrator a three-sheet report where I stated some of the observations that I’ve told this committee today, in regard to the accounting that was being done in the [Morale, Welfare & Recreation] department.  In fact, I called it “cooking the books in true Enron style.”  It was at that point that I was put under guard.

 

QUESTION:  And you were kept under guard until they transported you out of the country?

 

MCBRIDE:  Yes, sir.

 

 

 

Halliburton Sent a Civilian Convoy into a Known Combat Zone

 

“[W]e have sadly discovered evidence that proves beyond any doubt that Halliburton-KBR knew well before my clients were sent from Camp Anaconda on April 9 that the roads they would travel were currently engaged in active combat, that the areas were closed and off limits to civilian personnel, and that other Halliburton-KBR convoys, such as such as Mr. Larvenz’s, had been attacked at or near the same location which had already resulted in multiple civilian casualties.” (T. Scott Allen, Attorney for Former KBR Truck Drivers, 9/18/2006)

 

Halliburton Offered to Nominate Those Who Were Wounded for a Defense Department Medal—Provided They Waive All Claims against the Company

 

“In that letter, they actually — that letter says it is a medical release form.  They mislead the truck driver, tell him it’s a medical release form and we’re going to supply your records to the Pentagon so you can receive a government medal which was created on 9/11, the Defense of Freedom Medal.  And then they have, to an uneducated person, a release of liability included with it.” (T. Scott Allen, Attorney for Former KBR Truck Drivers, 9/18/2006)

 

 

 

Halliburton/KBR Contracting Process Was “Blatant and Improper”

 

“The abuse I observed called into question the independence of the [Army Corps of Engineers] contracting process.  I can unequivocally state that the abuse related to contracts awarded to KBR represents the most blatant and improper contract abuse I have witnessed during the course of my professional career.” (Bunnatine Greenhouse, Highest-Ranking Army Corps civilian, 6/27/2005)

 

After Testifying About Improper Contracting Processes, A High-Ranking Army Corps of Engineers Official Was Demoted

 

“I was the Principal Assistant Responsible for Contracting for the United States Army Corps of Engineers until I was removed from that position on August 27, 2005.  I was removed because I steadfastly resisted and attempted to alter what can be described as casual and clubby contracting practices by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers Commanders, and because I presented testimony before [the Democratic Policy Committee] on June 27, 2005.  At that time, I reported to this Committee that the worst contract abuse I witnessed during my entire professional career, which spans over twenty years, concerns contracts that were awarded to Halliburton subsidiary Kellogg Brown & Root.”  (Bunnatine Greenhouse, highest-ranking Army Corps civilian, 9/16/2005)

 

 

 

Testimony of Gary Butters, Chairman of Lloyd-Owen International, 6/27/2005:

 

QUESTION:  You testified, with your company’s help, another company called Geotech was transporting Kuwaiti fuel to Iraq at a cost of 18 cents per gallon.  Is that correct?

 

BUTTERS:  That’s correct.

 

QUESTION:  Now, let’s compare this to Halliburton’s costs.  Halliburton charged $1.30 per gallon to deliver gasoline from Kuwait.  In other words, they charged over seven times more than you do.  In your view, is there any way to justify such a large price difference?

 

BUTTERS:  Frankly, there isn’t.

 

 

 

“We were asked to initially assess our distribution points prior to delivery.  We have not, to date, seen a functioning KBR piece of equipment to where we deliver, that is Mufriq, Shibar (ph.), Nasariyah, Samawah, Diwaniyah, Amarah, Kut, Najaf, Karrada (ph.) and Hillah.  We have had to purchase equipment in order for us to download fuel such as generators, pumps, hoses, couplings.  Otherwise, it would not happen.” (Alan Waller, CEO of Lloyd-Owen International, 6/27/2005)

 

 

 

“[I]nexperienced officials, fear of decision-making, lack of communications, minimal security, no banks, and lots of money to spread around.  This chaos I have referred to as a ‘Wild West.’…[W]as waste of taxpayer’s and Iraqi DFI dollars what it had to be?  Were inefficiencies at a high level inevitably mandated by the circumstances?  I would give a firm ‘No’ to both questions.” (Franklin Willis, Former CPA Official, 2/14/2005)

 

 

 

CPA Officials In Charge “Didn’t Know What They Were Doing”

 

“[T]he people who were put in charge of rebuilding the health sector didn’t know what they were doing.  What I mean by that is that the individual that was put in charge of the CPA and his entire staff, among them none of them had training in public health.  None of them had lived overseas.  And not one of them had participated in the reconstruction of a country following a disaster or a war.  We have people with those sorts of expertise in the United States, and some of them in the U.S. government.  But none of them were appointed to the CPA health office.” (Richard Garfield, former CPA Advisor, Columbia University, 7/28/2006)

 

The Administration Appointee In Charge of Health Care Reconstruction Obstructed The Overall Effort And Wasted Time

 

“During the immediate post-conflict period, the United States had a clear opportunity to establish good relations with willing Iraqi health care providers…We were not able to progress quickly on the practical work needed due to a clear lack of understanding of the purpose, goals, strategies and expected outcomes of the USAID-supported project.  Much of my time in Iraq was not focused on work with the Iraqis to improve primary healthcare, but in discussion with Mr. Haveman [the Administration’s appointee at CPA to run healthcare reconstruction] on why the work needed to be done at all.”  (Mary Paterson, 7/28/2006)

 

The CPA Got, “At Best, A Very Poor Investment For the Monies That We Had Put Out” For Health Sector Reconstruction

 

“It is a challenging environment, therefore we need people who are familiar with those challenges and would be able to organize programs that would respond appropriately and effectively to them.  We did not have that.  And it was clear from 2004 forward, despite the personal level commitment of those people, that they would not be able to give the priorities to make those funds effective.  So what I’m saying is apart from ineffectual systems of administration of the monies where a subcontractor gave to a subcontractor gave to a subcontractor without supervision in the field, without a hands-on plan, even if those inefficiencies hadn’t occurred in the system, we would have had, at best, a very poor investment for the monies that we had put out.”  (Richard Garfield, Former CPA Advisor, Columbia University, 7/28/2006)

 

 

 

Basra Hospital was a “Showy Project” Inappropriate for Iraq’s Needs

 

“And the article that you mentioned this morning, on evaluating the Basra hospital is another aspect of this.  It is true that there are tremendous cost over-runs, it is true that there has not been much building.  But even if we had done a good job of building it, it was the inappropriate action at the time it was decided to build it.  The supplemental appropriations which Senate and House voted on for funding for health in Iraq, the postwar period, involved I think it was $860 million, and neither the House nor the Senate had — neither of them voted on the building of that hospital.  That hospital was something of a boondoggle.  It was a showy project which didn’t respond in an effective fashion for the monies involved to the health needs of the situation. (Richard Garfield, Former CPA Advisor, Columbia University, 7/28/2006)

 

Basra Hospital Project Ran a Year behind Schedule And at Least 100 Percent over Budget

 

“Beyond the consequences for health care in southern Iraq, abandoning the project could be tricky politically because of the high-profile support from Mrs. Bush and Ms Rice.  Congress allocated $50 million to the Basra Children’s Hospital in late 2003 as part of an $18.4 billion reconstruction package for Iraq.  Now the government estimates that the cost overruns are so great that the project will cost as much as $120 million to complete and will not be finished before September 2007, nearly a year later than planned.  Some other estimates put the overruns even higher.  Kadhim Hassan, general director of the Basra Health Department, said the project would be no more than 40 percent complete once the original $50 million, much of which is going to subcontractors, had been used up. He said little work had been done for months.” (New York Times, 7/28/3006)