

# United States Senate

WASHINGTON, DC 20510

## Memorandum

**To: Iraq Study Group**  
**From: Harry Reid and Dick Durbin**  
**Re: Iraq – Finding A Way Forward**  
**Date: August 2, 2006**

We are very grateful that you have taken on the important responsibility of helping policymakers find a way forward in Iraq. A free and stable Iraq is a goal that we all share. But we are terribly concerned that the Bush Administration's current approach is not working, and is not sustainable. As you know, Iraq has exploded in sectarian violence. Close to 2600 Americans have made the ultimate sacrifice, while well over 18,000 have been wounded, a third of them grievously. According to the United Nations, nearly 6000 Iraqis died from sectarian warfare in May and June alone. Tens of thousands more have been displaced. In short, we believe Iraq has descended into a civil war, and our troops are stuck in the middle.

We will not belabor the litany of mistakes made by Administration officials in managing the war effort. From the failure to deploy sufficient numbers of troops at the start of the war, to the prison abuse scandal at Abu Ghraib, to the failure to plan for the post-war occupation, the mistakes are well known. What we need now, however, is a plan to move forward. That's why your efforts are so important.

Below, we lay out five recommendations that provide an alternative to the current open-ended approach adopted by the Bush Administration. We think this is the best way to advance U.S. national security interests, stabilize Iraq, and provide relief to U.S. soldiers and taxpayers who have borne the burden of the Iraq effort. These recommendations were set forth in a letter we sent to the President on Sunday, July 30<sup>th</sup>. They were also embodied in a Senate Amendment offered to the 2007 Defense Authorization bill by Senators Carl Levin and Jack Reed, and in the "United States Policy in Iraq Act," enacted by the Congress last year. The letter to the President, the Levin/Reed amendment, and the United States Policy in Iraq Act are all attached. We hope you find these suggestions and documents useful, and we look forward to working with you in the months ahead.

### **Recommendations:**

1. **Responsibly redeploy U.S. forces and transition the U.S. mission in Iraq.** We think it is time to transition the U.S. mission to one of counter-terrorism, training, logistics and force protection. We also believe that a phased redeployment of U.S. forces should begin before the end of the year. This redeployment is critical to ensuring that Iraqis begin to take the lead for the security of their nation, and so that U.S. forces can be redeployed, if necessary, to other national security challenges elsewhere in the world. Reducing the U.S. footprint will also allow U.S. forces to begin to address alarming readiness issues in the Army. A redeployment will have the collateral benefit of reducing the specter of occupation, which according to our military commanders, is giving rise to some insurgent activities.

2. **Reconcile sectarian differences through more robust diplomacy.** We have been disappointed that the Administration has not done more to advocate for changes to the Iraqi Constitution that would achieve a fair sharing of power and resources. Nor has the Administration embraced calls for an international peace conference to bring the Shia, Sunnis and Kurds together to forge a lasting political settlement. Our military commanders remind us often that there are only political solutions to the problems in Iraq, not military ones. We hope, therefore, that you will emphasize the need for further constitutional changes and an international peace conference, modeled after the Dayton Accord of 1995 or the Bonn Agreement of 2002, in your group's final recommendations. We also think it would be useful for the President to appoint a full-time, high-level person of stature to assist the U.S. Ambassador in Iraq with diplomatic efforts within Iraq and within the broader Persian Gulf region.
3. **Regionalize the U.S. approach to dealing with Iraq.** We think it is long past time to get the other nations in the Persian Gulf region involved in assisting Iraq. Instead of allowing destabilizing and deconstructive influences from Iran and Syria to dominate the region's contributions to Iraq, the Administration, working with the permanent members of the Security Council, should launch a regional security initiative that brings together those nations that want to see Iraq succeed and that can help secure Iraq's borders, assist with institution building and economic reconstruction, and provide security forces training. Such an initiative could serve as a positive catalyst in addressing a number of broader root insecurity issues that affect key players in the region.
4. **Revitalize the economic reconstruction effort.** Ultimately, the struggle in Iraq, and across the Middle East, is a war to win the hearts and minds of millions of disaffected people and to empower moderate political actors across the region. In Iraq, these were people who were brutalized by a dictator, only to see a botched occupation and rebuilding effort. Every major economic indicator in Iraq is headed in the wrong direction. There are few State Department or other U.S. government personnel located outside of the Green Zone. The U.S. and its allies can and must do better. We believe the United States ought to be playing a greater leadership role in revitalizing the nation-building effort, engaging the international community, seeing that projects actually get completed, cleaning up the corruption, eliminating the no-bid contracts, ensuring that other nations live up to their commitments, and empowering Iraqis to seize initiative in reconstruction and economic development in Iraq.
5. **Rebuild the U.S. military:** The extended conflict in Iraq has left the military stretched thin and its equipment in disrepair. Considerable investments in manpower and equipment are urgently needed. Readiness levels for the Army are at lows not seen since Vietnam, as not a single non-deployed Army combat brigade is prepared to meet its wartime mission. Some estimates suggest it will require \$50 billion just to repair and replace the military equipment used in Iraq. It would be appropriate, therefore, when developing plans for Iraq, to simultaneously address the needs of the U.S. military. The two subjects are inter-related.

**Congress of the United States**  
**Washington, DC 20515**

July 30, 2006

The President  
The White House  
Washington, D.C.

Dear Mr. President:

While the world has been focused on the crisis in the Middle East, Iraq has exploded in violence. Some 6,000 Iraqis were killed in May and June, and sectarian and insurgent violence continues to claim American and Iraqi lives at an alarming rate. In the face of this onslaught, one can only conclude that the Baghdad security plan you announced five weeks ago is in great jeopardy.

Despite the latest evidence that your Administration lacks a coherent strategy to stabilize Iraq and achieve victory, there has been virtually no diplomatic effort to resolve sectarian differences, no regional effort to establish a broader security framework, and no attempt to revive a struggling reconstruction effort. Instead, we learned of your plans to redeploy an additional 5,000 U.S. troops into an urban war zone in Baghdad. Far from implementing a comprehensive "Strategy for Victory" as you promised months ago, your Administration's strategy appears to be one of trying to avoid defeat.

Meanwhile, U.S. troops and taxpayers continue to pay a high price as your Administration searches for a policy. Over 2,500 Americans have made the ultimate sacrifice and over 18,000 others have been wounded. The Iraq war has also strained our military and constrained our ability to deal with other challenges. Readiness levels for the Army are at lows not seen since Vietnam, as virtually no active Army non-deployed combat brigade is prepared to perform its wartime missions. American taxpayers have already contributed over \$300 billion and each week we stay in Iraq adds nearly \$3 billion more to our record budget deficit.

In the interests of American national security, our troops, and our taxpayers, the open-ended commitment in Iraq that you have embraced cannot and should not be sustained.

Rather, we continue to believe that it is time for Iraqis to step forward and take the lead for securing and governing their own country. This is the principle enshrined in the "United States Policy in Iraq Act" enacted last year. This law declares 2006 to be a year of "significant transition to full Iraqi sovereignty, with Iraqi security forces taking the lead for the security of a free and sovereign Iraq, thereby creating the conditions for the phased redeployment of United States forces from Iraq." Regrettably, your policy seems to be moving in the opposite direction.

This legislation made clear that Iraqi political leaders must be informed that American patience, blood and treasure are not unlimited. We were disappointed that you did not convey this message to Prime Minister Maliki during his recent visit. Reducing the U.S. footprint in Iraq will not only give the Iraqis a greater incentive to take the lead for the security of their own nation, but will also allow U.S. forces to be able to respond to contingencies affecting the security of the United States elsewhere in the world.

We believe that a phased redeployment of U.S. forces from Iraq should begin before the end of 2006. U.S. forces in Iraq should transition to a more limited mission focused on counterterrorism, training and logistical support of Iraqi security forces, and force protection of U.S. personnel.

Additionally, every effort should be made to urge the Iraqis to take the steps necessary to achieve a broad-based and sustainable political settlement, including amending the constitution to achieve a fair sharing of power and resources. It is also essential to disarm the militias and ensure forces loyal to the national government. Finally, an international conference should be convened to persuade other governments to be more involved, and to secure the resources necessary to finance Iraq's reconstruction and rebuild its economy.

Mr. President, simply staying the course in Iraq is not working. We need to take a new direction. We believe these recommendations comprise an effective alternative to the current open-ended commitment which is not producing the progress in Iraq we would all like to see. Thank you for your careful consideration of these suggestions.

Mary Kay

Carl Klein

Murray  
Jay Rockefeller

Ed Staben

Rich Austin

Nancy Pelosi

~~Steny Hironaka~~  
Jack Murtha

Joe Hain

Tom Lantos

Max Baucus

AMENDMENT NO. \_\_\_\_\_ Calendar No. \_\_\_\_\_

Purpose: To state the sense of Congress on United States policy on Iraq.

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES—109th Cong., 2d Sess.

**S. 2766**

To authorize appropriations for fiscal year 2007 for military activities of the Department of Defense, for military construction, and for defense activities of the Department of Energy, to prescribe personnel strengths for such fiscal year for the Armed Forces, and for other purposes.

Referred to the Committee on \_\_\_\_\_ and  
ordered to be printed

Ordered to lie on the table and to be printed

AMENDMENT intended to be proposed by Mr. LEVIN (for himself, Mr. REED, Mrs. FEINSTEIN, and Mr. SALAZAR)

Viz:

1 At the end of subtitle A of title XII, add the fol-  
2 lowing:

3 **SEC. 1209. UNITED STATES POLICY ON IRAQ.**

4 (a) **SHORT TITLE.**—This section may be cited as the  
5 “United States Policy on Iraq Act of 2006”.

6 (b) **FINDINGS.**—Congress makes the following find-  
7 ings:

1           (1) Global terrorist networks, including those  
2           that attacked the United States on September 11,  
3           2001, continue to threaten the national security of  
4           the United States and are recruiting, planning, and  
5           developing capabilities to attack the United States  
6           and its allies throughout the world.

7           (2) Winning the fight against terrorist networks  
8           requires an integrated, comprehensive effort that  
9           uses all facets of power of the United States and the  
10          members of the international community who value  
11          democracy, freedom, and the rule of law.

12          (3) The United States Armed Forces, particu-  
13          larly the Army and Marine Corps, are stretched  
14          thin, and many soldiers and Marines have experi-  
15          enced three or more deployments to combat zones.

16          (4) Sectarian violence has surpassed the insur-  
17          gency and terrorism as the main security threat in  
18          Iraq, increasing the prospects of a broader civil war  
19          which could draw in Iraq's neighbors.

20          (5) United States and coalition forces have  
21          trained and equipped more than 116,000 Iraqi sol-  
22          diers, sailors, and airmen, and more than 148,000  
23          Iraqi police, highway patrol, and other Ministry of  
24          Interior forces.

1           (6) Of the 102 operational Iraqi Army combat  
2           battalions, 69 are either in the lead or operating  
3           independently, according to the May 2006 report of  
4           the Administration to Congress entitled “Measuring  
5           Stability and Security in Iraq”;

6           (7) Congress expressed its sense in the National  
7           Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2006  
8           (119 Stat. 3466) that “calendar year 2006 should  
9           be a period of significant transition to full Iraqi sov-  
10          ereignty, with Iraqi security forces taking the lead  
11          for the security of a free and sovereign Iraq, thereby  
12          creating the conditions for the phased redeployment  
13          of United States forces from Iraq”.

14          (8) Iraq’s security forces are heavily infiltrated  
15          by sectarian militia, which has greatly increased sec-  
16          tarian tensions and impeded the development of ef-  
17          fective security services loyal to the Iraq Govern-  
18          ment.

19          (9) With the approval by the Iraqi Council of  
20          Representatives of the ministers of defense, national  
21          security, and the interior on June 7, 2006, the en-  
22          tire cabinet of Prime Minister Maliki is now in  
23          place.

24          (10) Pursuant to the Iraq Constitution, the  
25          Council of Representatives is to appoint a Panel

1       which will have 4 months to recommend changes to  
2       the Iraq Constitution.

3           (11) Despite pledges of more than  
4       \$8,000,000,000 in assistance for Iraq by foreign  
5       governments other than the United States at the  
6       Madrid International Donors' Conference in October  
7       2003, only \$3,500,000,000 of such assistance has  
8       been forthcoming.

9           (12) The current open-ended commitment of  
10       United States forces in Iraq is unsustainable and a  
11       deterrent to the Iraqis making the political com-  
12       promises and personnel and resource commitments  
13       that are needed for the stability and security of Iraq.

14       (c) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Con-  
15       gress that in order to change course from an open-ended  
16       commitment and to promote the assumption of security  
17       responsibilities by the Iraqis, thus advancing the chances  
18       for success in Iraq—

19           (1) the following actions need to be taken to  
20       help achieve the broad-based and sustainable polit-  
21       ical settlement so essential for defeating the insur-  
22       gency and preventing all-out civil war—

23           (A) there must be a fair sharing of polit-  
24       ical power and economic resources among all  
25       the Iraqi groups so as to invest them in the for-

1           mation of an Iraqi nation by either amendments  
2           to the Iraq Constitution or by legislation or  
3           other means, within the timeframe provided for  
4           in the Iraq Constitution;

5           (B) the President should convene an inter-  
6           national conference so as to more actively in-  
7           volve the international community and Iraq's  
8           neighbors, promote a durable political settle-  
9           ment among Iraqis, reduce regional interference  
10          in Iraq's internal affairs, encourage more coun-  
11          tries to contribute to Iraq's extensive needs,  
12          and ensure that pledged funds are forthcoming;

13          (C) the Iraq Government should promptly  
14          and decisively disarm the militias and remove  
15          those members of the Iraqi security forces  
16          whose loyalty to the Iraq Government is in  
17          doubt; and

18          (D) the President should—

19               (i) expedite the transition of United  
20               States forces in Iraq to a limited presence  
21               and mission of training Iraqi security  
22               forces, providing logistic support of Iraqi  
23               security forces, protecting United States  
24               infrastructure and personnel, and partici-

1           pating in targeted counterterrorism activi-  
2           ties;

3                   (ii) after consultation with the Gov-  
4           ernment of Iraq, begin the phased rede-  
5           ployment of United States forces from Iraq  
6           this year; and

7                   (iii) submit to Congress a plan by the  
8           end of 2006 with estimated dates for the  
9           continued phased redeployment of United  
10          States forces from Iraq, with the under-  
11          standing that unexpected contingencies  
12          may arise;

13           (2) during and after the phased redeployment  
14          of United States forces from Iraq, the United States  
15          will need to sustain a nonmilitary effort to actively  
16          support reconstruction, governance, and a durable  
17          political solution in Iraq; and

18           (3) the President should carefully assess the  
19          impact that ongoing United States military oper-  
20          ations in Iraq are having on the capability of the  
21          United States Government to conduct an effective  
22          counterterrorism campaign to defeat the broader  
23          global terrorist networks that threaten the United  
24          States.

**PENDING**

HC-2, 3, 6

AMENDMENT NO. \_\_\_\_\_ Calendar No. \_\_\_\_\_

Purpose: To clarify and recommend changes to the policy of the United States on Iraq and to require reports on certain matters relating to Iraq.

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES—109th Cong., 1st Sess.

S. 1042

AMENDMENT No. 518

To a: By Warner - Feist tary  
To: S 1042 itary  
part-  
for  
other

6  
Page(s)

GPO: 2000 68-330 (mac)

Referred to the Committee on \_\_\_\_\_ and  
ordered to be printed

Ordered to lie on the table and to be printed

AMENDMENT intended to be proposed by <sup>Mr. Warner, Mr. Feist</sup> ~~Mr. LEVIN~~ (for himself, ~~Mr. BIDEN, Mr. REID, Mr. DODD, Mr. KERRY, Mr. FEINGOLD, Mr. DURBIN, Mr. REED, Mr. KENNEDY, and Mrs. FEINSTEIN~~)

Viz:

- 1 At the end of title XII, add the following:
- 2 SEC. . UNITED STATES POLICY ON IRAQ.
- 3 (a) SHORT TITLE.—This section may be cited as the
- 4 "United States Policy on Iraq Act".

1 (b) SENSE OF SENATE.—It is the sense of the Senate  
2 that, in order to succeed in Iraq—

3 (1) members of the United States Armed  
4 Forces who are serving or have served in Iraq and  
5 their families deserve the utmost respect and the  
6 heartfelt gratitude of the American people for their  
7 unwavering devotion to duty, service to the Nation,  
8 and selfless sacrifice under the most difficult cir-  
9 cumstances;

10 (2) it is important to recognize that the Iraqi  
11 people have made enormous sacrifices and that the  
12 overwhelming majority of Iraqis want to live in  
13 peace and security;

14 (3) calendar year 2006 should be a period of  
15 significant transition to full Iraqi sovereignty, with  
16 Iraqi security forces taking the lead for the security  
17 of a free and sovereign Iraq, thereby creating the  
18 conditions for the phased redeployment of United  
19 States forces from Iraq;

20 (4) United States military forces should not  
21 stay in Iraq ~~indefinitely~~ <sup>any longer than required</sup> and the people of Iraq  
22 should be so advised;

23 (5) the Administration should tell the leaders of  
24 all groups and political parties in Iraq that they  
25 need to make the compromises necessary to achieve

1 the broad-based and sustainable political settlement  
2 that is essential for defeating the insurgency in Iraq,  
3 within the schedule they set for themselves; and

4 (6) the Administration needs to explain to Con-  
5 gress and the American people its strategy for the  
6 successful completion of the mission in Iraq.

7 (c) REPORTS TO CONGRESS ON UNITED STATES  
8 POLICY AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN IRAQ.—Not later  
9 than <sup>90</sup>~~30~~ days after the date of the enactment of this Act,  
10 and every three months thereafter until all United States  
11 combat brigades have redeployed from Iraq, the President  
12 shall submit to Congress an unclassified report on United  
13 States policy and military operations in Iraq. Each report  
14 shall include, <sup>To the extent practicable,</sup> the following <sup>unclassified information:</sup>

15 (1) The current military mission and the diplo-  
16 matic, political, economic, and military measures, if  
17 any, that are being or have been undertaken to suc-  
18 cessfully complete or support that mission, including:

19 (A) Efforts to convince Iraq's main com-  
20 munities to make the compromises necessary  
21 for a broad-based and sustainable political set-  
22 tlement.

23 (B) Engaging the international community  
24 and the region in the effort to stabilize Iraq

1           and to forge a broad-based and sustainable po-  
2           litical settlement.

3           (C) Strengthening the capacity of Iraq's  
4           government ministries.

5           (D) Accelerating the delivery of basic serv-  
6           ices.

7           (E) Securing the delivery of pledged eco-  
8           nomic assistance from the international commu-  
9           nity and additional pledges of assistance.

10          (F) Training Iraqi security forces and  
11          transferring security responsibilities to those  
12          forces and the government of Iraq.

13          (2) Whether the Iraqis have made the com-  
14          promises necessary to achieve the broad-based and  
15          sustainable political settlement that is essential for  
16          defeating the insurgency in Iraq.

17          (3) Any specific conditions included in the April  
18          2005 Multi-National Forces-Iraq campaign action  
19          plan (referred to in United States Government Ac-  
20          countability Office October 2005 report on Rebuild-  
21          ing Iraq: DOD Reports Should Link Economic, Gov-  
22          ernance, and Security Indicators to Conditions for  
23          Stabilizing Iraq), and any subsequent updates to  
24          that campaign plan, that must be met in order to

1 provide for the transition of security responsibility to  
2 Iraqi security forces.

3 (4) To the extent that these conditions are not  
4 covered under paragraph (3), the following should  
5 also be addressed:

6 (A) The number of battalions of the Iraqi  
7 Armed Forces that must be able to operate  
8 independently or to take the lead in  
9 counterinsurgency operations and the defense of  
10 Iraq's territory.

11 (B) The number of Iraqi special police  
12 units that must be able to operate independ-  
13 ently or to take the lead in maintaining law and  
14 order and fighting the insurgency.

15 (C) The number of regular police that  
16 must be trained and equipped to maintain law  
17 and order.

18 (D) The ability of Iraq's Federal ministries  
19 and provincial and local governments to inde-  
20 pendently sustain, direct, and coordinate Iraq's  
21 security forces.

22 (5) The criteria to be used to evaluate progress  
23 toward meeting such conditions.

24 (6) A schedule for meeting such conditions, an  
25 assessment of the extent to which such conditions

1 have been met, information regarding variables that  
2 could alter that schedule, and the reasons for any  
3 subsequent changes to that schedule.

4 ~~(7) A campaign plan with estimated dates for~~  
5 ~~the phased redeployment of the United States~~  
6 ~~Armed Forces from Iraq as each condition is met,~~  
7 ~~with the understanding that unexpected circum-~~  
8 ~~stances may arise.~~