

Sec. 1. FOREIGN TALENT PROGRAMS.

This section requires NIH extramural researchers to disclose participation in foreign talent programs, which includes providing to NIH copies of all grants, contracts, or other agreements related to their participation in such programs.

Sec. 2. SECURING IDENTIFIABLE, SENSITIVE INFORMATION.

This section requires the HHS Secretary to consult with national security experts (e.g., Director of National Intelligence, Secretary of State, Secretary of Defense) to ensure that HHS biomedical research involving human genomic information appropriately considers national security risks. Also requires the Secretary to (1) develop a risk framework for assessing and managing such national security risks, including criteria for conducting risk assessments, security controls and training, and risk-reduction methods; and (2) develop and implement controls related to the risk framework to ensure appropriate data access and involve individuals with national security expertise in the evaluation of certain data access requests. Two years after the date of enactment of this section, the HHS Secretary shall update human genomic data access and sharing policies related to human genomic data based on emerging national security threats. Additionally, this section requires a briefing to appropriate Congressional committees on the activities carried out under this section.

Sec. 3. DUTIES OF THE DIRECTOR.

This sections adds two new duties for the Director of the National Institutes of Health related to national security. This section requires the NIH Director to consult with HHS Office of National Security (ONS), the HHS Assistant Secretary for Preparedness and Response, and other relevant agencies (e.g., Director of National Intelligence, Director of FBI) regarding HHS biomedical research that may be relevant to national security matters. It also requires the NIH Director to ensure that recipients of NIH funding and related entities adhere to appropriate technology practices to secure identifiable, sensitive information.

Sec. 4. PROTECTING AMERICA'S BIOMEDICAL RESEARCH ENTERPRISE

This section requires the HHS Secretary to consult with the National Security Advisor, the Director of National Intelligence, the Director of the FBI, and the heads of other relevant agencies, research institutions and advocacy groups, to (1) identify ways to improve the protection of intellectual property and other types of sensitive information in biomedical research, (2) develop strategies to address national security threats in biomedical research, including through foreign talent programs, (3) make recommendations to protect proprietary information from potential misuse that may pose national security risks, and (4) develop a framework to identify areas of federally supported biomedical research that are emerging areas of interest for adversaries and may pose national security risks, if subjected to foreign influence. Additionally, under this section, the HHS Secretary shall regularly review policies made under this section and provide updates as appropriate, as well as submit a report to the President and relevant congressional committees that addresses the findings and recommendations of this section.

Sec. 5. GAO STUDY.

This section authorizes the Government Accountability Office (GAO) to assess the extent to which HHS funds are used for human genomic sequencing services or genetic services provided by entities, or subsidiaries of such entities, organized under the laws of a country or countries of concern, as determined by the Director of National Intelligence or the head of another Federal departments and agencies. As part of this study, GAO is required to make recommendations to address any vulnerabilities identified and submit a report to Congress no later than two years after enactment.

Sec. 6. REPORT ON PROGRESS TO ADDRESS UNDUE FOREIGN INFLUENCE.

This section requires the HHS Secretary to submit an annual report to Congress on actions taken to (1) address cases of research misconduct related to foreign influence; (2) document the number of potential cases reported to NIH, cases referred to law enforcement agencies, and enforcement actions taken; and (3) prevent, address, and mitigate research misconduct related to foreign influence.